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6Executive summary
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
At the very heart of a changing society lies 
the number and composition of its members. 
Population growth has shaped the EU over 
recent decades and now its population is ageing. 
The slow-moving shift towards longer-living,  
lower-fertility, higher-educated societies brings  
the EU to new demographic frontiers, as it does  
in North America and East Asia. 
Facing these developments naturally prompts  
the questions: Who will live and work in Europe  
in the coming decades? How many, and with what 
skills? To answer these, we consider key factors 
that will influence European demographics over  
the coming decades.
To move beyond some common misconceptions, 
this report brings relevant scientific analyses  
to the forefront by presenting a series of 
demographic scenarios for the future of the EU.  
By examining not only the role of migration, fertility 
and mortality, but also education and labour force 
participation, we can outline a more comprehensive 
view of possible futures than conventional 
demographic projections. 
While some of the scenarios indicate probable 
developments, others are hypothetical and 
meant to be instructive for understanding the full 
spectrum of possible futures. The value of these 
scenarios is to improve our ability to anticipate 
the coming changes and to guide our responses 
to them. 
The following key messages express the core 
findings from the work of the Centre of Expertise 
on Population and Migration.
We are living longer and can lead 
more productive lives  
One of the most important trends in the EU  
is ageing. Thanks to advances in medicine and 
quality of life, the average life expectancy at birth 
in the EU is about 81 years. Shifts to longer lives 
come as part of the larger, nearly universal process 
of transitioning from pre-modern to post-industrial 
demographic patterns.
While it is an important achievement that we are 
on average living longer, an increasing proportion of 
people aged 65+ can also bring social and economic 
challenges. There are concerns about how to provide 
for the growing proportion of retired citizens who 
are dependent on a smaller labour force. Yet, absent 
from the often superficial discussions are reflections 
on the increasing number of years of active and 
healthy life, greater productivity, and possible loss 
of jobs due to technological advancements. All of 
which have profound implications on what societies 
will require from their future working populations. 
Automation alone may significantly cut the need 
for labour, calling into question conventional 
assumptions about what policymakers should target 
as the ‘ideal’ size of the labour force.
It is important to acknowledge that neither higher 
fertility nor more migration will stop population 
ageing because the momentum has been decisively 
set by past, long-term demographic trends. 
However, reaching the age of 65 is no longer 
synonymous with the end of a person’s productive 
life. Overall, we are living more productive lives 
which, together with flexible retirement ages, 
can help to alleviate the economic challenges 
arising from changes in the conventionally defined 
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working-age population and the increasing 
ratio of workers to non-workers (known as the 
dependency ratio).
A smaller, better-educated labour 
force on the horizon
Another reason for optimism is the fact that 
the EU’s labour force is clearly becoming better 
educated over time. In almost all scenarios, the 
EU’s future labour force will be more highly skilled 
and therefore likely to be more productive and 
adaptive to an ever-changing job market.
The EU labour force is transforming through social 
development and the ageing process. The total size 
of the labour force is projected to get smaller over 
the next four decades, based on the assumption 
that the current patterns continue. According to this 
assumption, the projected decrease in the size  
of the labour force will come from the population 
with low (from 50.7 to 14.0 million) and middle 
(from 108.2 to 74.2 million) levels of education. 
At the same time, the number of workers with 
a short post-secondary education (such as 
technical training), a bachelor’s, a master’s 
degree or higher, is rising, not just as regards their 
proportion of the overall labour force, but also  
in absolute terms. In every country, since the 
younger cohorts are better educated than the older 
ones, these post-secondary groups are expected  
to almost double (+45%) over the next 40 years.
Considering the future context, any possible 
reduction in the size of the labour force may  
not be an economic problem if future jobs are 
fewer in number and require more skills. Already 
today unemployment is generally higher among the 
lower skilled and there may be even fewer low skills 
jobs in the future. Regardless  of changes in the 
population’s age structure and labour force size,  
it can be expected that the human capital of future 
workers of any age, measured by the highest level 
of their educational attainment, will be higher than 
it is today. 
Labour force participation  
as a remedy for the challenges  
of population ageing 
Using a set of demographic scenarios of the future 
that highlight the impact of changes to a variety 
of factors, it becomes clear that the most feasible 
and effective remedy to negative consequences 
of population ageing is neither focusing on higher 
fertility nor more migration, but rather increasing 
labour force participation. 
Extending constant labour-force participation  
rates into the future shows the likely path  
to a smaller labour force and increasing 
dependency ratio. Scenarios that deviate from 
this course, following either 1) the equalisation 
of labour-force participation between men and 
women, or 2) a gradual convergence of all Member 
States to the participation rates of men and women 
already seen in Sweden today, demonstrate the 
power that improving labour-participation rates  
has to nullify potential increases in dependency.
In fact, the momentum is on the side  
of increasing labour-force participation.  
If it continues to grow in the future, the labour 
force size and dependency ratio could stabilise 
at current levels. In other words, a strong but 
realistic increase – as is already the reality  
in Sweden – of labour-force participation over 
time could compensate for a large part of the 
anticipated negative economic consequences  
of population ageing in the future. 
Higher immigration volume  
would increase labour force size,  
but much less the essential ratio  
of workers-to-non-workers
To the extent the EU is a destination region  
for international migration, immigration becomes  
an influential factor on demographic 
developments. Policymakers regularly balance 
migration policy with the best interests  
of the Member State. Doing so while being mindful 
of a long-term understanding of demography 
is crucial. At the core of such considerations are 
factors including: the volume of immigrants from 
third countries entering the Member State, their 
levels of education, how well they will integrate 
into the labour market and society at large,  
and how effective the Member State  
is at enforcing their migration policy. 
Migration levels can have a large influence  
on the total population size and the size of the 
labour force.  With no third country immigration, 
the natural decline resulting from lower fertility 
would bring the EU population to 466 million  
by 2060, the level observed in the 1980s. 
However, migration levels have a limited effect 
on changing the EU’s age structure, in part 
because migrants tend to settle for the long 
term and to age just as the native population 
does. As such, irrespective of various levels  
of immigration, the findings of this report show 
an almost inevitable trend towards continued 
demographic ageing in the EU. 
While a high volume of immigration would increase 
the overall size of the EU labour force, it would 
have a limited impact on the proportion  
of workers to non-workers in the long-run.  
If higher immigration volumes were to coincide with 
deteriorating economic integration of migrants, 
it would actually result in a labour force situation 
that is worse than with medium or low volumes  
of immigration, which highlights the importance  
of effective efforts for economic integration.
Westward movement inside the 
EU has substantial impacts on the 
population sizes of Member States
In recent decades, intra-EU mobility – the free 
movement between EU Member States – has 
facilitated population changes within the EU. 
Over the past 25 years, some of the Eastern 
European Member States have lost a large share 
of their population through a combination of low 
fertility and, most notably, sizeable emigration. 
    Greater 
labour force 
participation 
has more impact 
on alleviating 
pressure from 
ageing than 
either fertility 
or migration
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Dramatically, Bulgaria and the Baltic States lost 
between 16% and 26%. 
Intra-EU mobility has the potential to produce large 
population shifts within the EU over time. If the 
movements of recent years persist as they have, 
the population of Romania would reduce from  
19.9 million in 2015 to 13.8 million by 2060 (-30% 
of the population). Conversely, the losses would be 
less than half without intra-EU mobility (only -14%). 
The receiving Member States rely on these flows to 
help compensate for their own ageing populations, 
but the effect on their total populations is more 
limited because they are generally more populous.
Pre-existing economic disparities between Member 
States have encouraged many citizens to search 
for work in places other than their country of origin. 
These developments have likely been to the economic 
benefit of the union as a whole, but not necessarily 
for all sending Member States. This contributes to 
slowing the convergence between Member States, 
and impacts areas such as infrastructure, education 
and even population ageing. This in turn has 
implications for the goals of economic development 
and Cohesion Policy, in particular when the movement 
is disproportionately highly skilled workers educated  
in the sending Member States.
Differences in wages and living standards 
continue to drive westward migration within 
the EU.  Targeting economic inequality between 
Member States can encourage greater cohesion 
and integration and can help those Member States 
facing disproportionate population decline, a loss 
of working-age population, brain drain and more 
pronounced population ageing. Policies should 
address practical, labour-force-oriented skills 
and try to reverse the education selectivity of 
emigration by offering competitive employment 
opportunities to the highly skilled and possibly 
facilitating return migration of some of the talent 
that has left. 
Losing large numbers  
of highly skilled workers leads  
to lower productive potential  
and accelerated population ageing 
The loss of talent to comparatively higher-
income countries continues to confront some 
societies within the EU, and many others around 
the globe. This has demographic implications, 
whereby sending countries find themselves with 
a smaller and less-educated workforce. Such 
changes would coincide with a more rapidly 
ageing population because emigrants tend  
to be early-career adults. The high emigration  
of talent may also negatively impact innovation 
and economic growth. 
As an illustrative example of how high emigration 
impacts demographics, we use a hypothetical 
case of the EU falling far behind in future global 
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competition. By simply extending Spain’s financial 
crisis emigration rates into the future for the EU 
as a whole, we can see how fast high emigration 
depletes the working-age population of the EU – 
50% by 2050 in this hypothetical case. While not  
a scenario to be viewed as a likely future  
for the EU as a whole, it helps demonstrate what 
some countries are facing and how the currently 
observed pattern of net migration inflows should 
not be automatically assumed to continue  
in the long term.
The question of high emigration by educated 
citizens, or ‘brain drain’, highlights the 
interconnectedness between global migration flows 
and local demographics. Therefore, to understand 
the context of the EU’s future population,  
it is also necessary to look beyond the borders  
of the EU. Neighbouring regions such as Africa  
and Western Asia face very different demographic 
and migratory trends. 
Actual realised migration to the EU will, in part, 
depend on its attractiveness as a destination – 
that is, the pull factors created by Member States. 
At the same time, socio-economic development  
in third countries may also increase the propensity 
to undertake migration journeys. Creating  
a system which does not undermine  
the development of human capital in countries  
of origin by making it harder for third countries  
to retain their highest-skilled workers  
is one of many dilemmas.
Pressure from continued population 
growth in Africa and Western Asia  
can lead to an increase in  
push factors for migration 
Africa’s population is projected to increase by a factor 
of two to three over the coming decades, or possibly 
even more in the event of stalled socio-economic 
development. In addition, population growth in 
Western Asia will also be significant. For example,  
the population of Afghanistan is likely to triple  
and that of Pakistan to almost double. Such massive 
projected population increases require consideration 
of the future job opportunities and economic growth. 
The peace and stability necessary to facilitate such 
opportunities may also be challenged by population 
growth. These challenges can contribute to creating 
push factors for migration, that is, conditions that 
drive people to emigrate from their home countries. 
Conflict and insecurity are central push factors. 
Emigration is also linked to people deciding  
to migrate because of a lack of opportunities to 
thrive in their own country, for instance due to high 
youth unemployment and too few appropriate jobs. 
Similarly, climate change can influence migration  
by affecting other push factors of migration such  
as political and economic conditions. For example,  
climate change can be a possible trigger of conflict, 
which in turn would lead to migration. When direct 
climate-change-related migration does occur,  
we find that it tends to be mostly intra-regional.  
   Regardless  
of changes in the 
size of the labour 
force, the human 
capital of future 
workers in the EU 
will be higher than 
it is today
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This is in line with the fact that intra-regional 
migration, for example within Africa, makes up  
by far the largest share of migration globally.
The prospect of climate change and the expected 
population growth in Africa and Western Asia 
are likely to present important challenges. Thus, 
pursuing policies that enhance general resilience 
and local employment opportunities and foster 
stability and security are critical to building 
sustainable alternatives to migration  
in the countries of origin.
Girls’ education matters greatly  
for the future of population growth 
in Africa 
While Africa and Western Asia are facing high 
population growth, many regions of the world have 
progressed towards late stages of the demographic 
transition with low rates of both mortality and 
fertility, notably East Asia, North America and 
Europe. During the second half of the century, 
world population may even eventually peak and 
start to reduce slightly, depending largely on how 
fast fertility levels in Africa fall to moderate levels.
Rapid population growth creates an urgent need 
for expanding education in Africa. Education 
expansion must keep pace with the pressure 
coming from rapid population growth, as it holds 
the key to accelerating the demographic transition 
and bringing development successes within reach. 
Achieving such goals depends, in particular,  
on giving girls access to education, as education 
and family planning are closely intertwined. 
Education broadens horizons and helps bring 
fertility into the realm of conscious choice for both 
women and men. Evidence from educational sub-
populations within countries indicates that higher 
living standards and decisions for moderate fertility 
levels accompany higher education  
and the associated wider range of life choices. 
Demographic changes are long term and occur  
at a steady and predictable pace. This provides  
us with a unique opportunity for foresight 
because it enables us to study how certain  
trends are likely to impact the future populations 
of EU Member States and the world. In this way, 
the scenarios examined in this report help to 
enable evidence-based planning for the future.
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Introduction
The Centre of Expertise on Population  
and Migration (CEPAM)1 was founded by the 
European Commission and the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)  
in response to the migration events of 2015. 
Despite its origins in the dramatic scenes that 
seized global attention, CEPAM’s mission has been 
to focus on the long term, providing analyses  
of the gradual, but consequential demographic 
changes taking place across the EU and wider world.
The sections
The first five sections focus on demographic 
challenges inside the EU, such as population 
ageing, a shrinking labour force, more non-working 
people being dependent on working people,  
and showing the impact of high levels  
of emigration in some EU Member States.  
With these challenges in mind, the report looks 
towards 2060 to understand the long-term  
effects of alternative scenarios for the future,  
and whether undesirable consequences can be 
limited or counteracted.
As the EU and its demographics do not exist  
in isolation, Sections 6 to 8 explore relevant world 
demographic trends. The topics covered include 
the future of global population growth and the 
potential divergent trajectories. Then, moving from 
human numbers to qualitative decisions about 
migration, the reports looks at push factors such  
as conflict, instability and climate change.
Finally, the report covers the current limitations 
of demographic data and research capacity 
for demographic modelling. Overcoming these 
limitations is essential to providing a solid scientific 
basis for the development of future policies.
The scenarios and narratives
Due to the inertia of demographic processes, 
d emographers are able to project changing 
population sizes and structures for decades into 
the future. We can consider the impact of future 
EU demographic changes by using demographic 
scenarios. The projections are based on a few 
clearly identifiable quantitative assumptions 
which refer to future forces of change, such 
as fertility, mortality, migration or changes in 
education and labour-force participation. Different 
combinations of such assumptions are called 
demographic scenarios.
In this report, we use a number of demographic 
scenarios to study different, possible migration 
flows into the EU. The scenarios are described 
in each section. Reference points for all these 
scenarios are the ‘central’, ‘medium’, or ‘SSP2’2  
scenarios which make middle-of-the-road 
assumptions on future trends, closest to what  
is considered likely from today’s perspective. 
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In addition to the central or medium scenario, we 
have developed a set of scenarios, which are used 
in Sections 1-6, based around certain parameters 
(e.g. ‘zero’ or no migration; a 25% increase in the 
fertility rates, or the equal participation of men and 
women in the labour force). Such parameter-based 
scenarios are useful for unpacking the forces that 
shape future demographic trends and thus also 
have immediate policy relevance.
For Section 3, we use alternative narratives 
concerning the characteristics of migration  
to the EU, and build scenarios around them  
to show the different effects of changing variables. 
The scenarios range from high and low volumes  
of migration to high and low educational 
attainment of migrants. These migration narratives 
have been formed around real-life examples by 
looking at migration to specific countries, such 
as Canada or Japan. The narratives have been 
developed over the past year in a consultation 
process with different European Commission 
Directorates-General and external experts.  
The report also builds on the research on migration 
conducted by the Joint Research Centre (JRC).3
We used multidimensional macro models  
of population dynamics as well as micro-simulation 
models to be able to project such scenarios 
for multiple human characteristics over many 
decades in the future. The macro models divide 
populations by age, sex, levels of education, 
labour-force participation and place of residence. 
However, beyond a certain number of subdivisions, 
it becomes more feasible to use micro-simulation 
rather than macro-simulation. Such simulations 
generate large numbers of virtual individuals  
for whom many more different characteristics can 
be captured and their future distribution modelled. 
For this report, an important example of analysis 
that could only be carried out by micro-simulation 
is immigrants’ duration of stay in the country, 
which is essential for forecasting their integration 
into the labour market (see Section 3). 
The terminology
A glossary of demographic terms is listed  
at the end of the report.
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SUMMARY
The dominant demographic challenge facing the EU comes from population ageing, 
commonly understood as an increasing proportion of people aged 65 and above. This 
section looks at possible measures to counteract associated concerns – particularly 
that more elderly people will depend on a smaller working population – by looking 
at how different scenarios change the EU’s total population, the size of its potential 
labour force, and the population that will be 65+ by 2060.
Neither higher fertility nor more immigration will stop population ageing, as the 
momentum has been decisively set from past, long-term trends. At the same time, we 
are living more productive lives which, together with flexible retirement ages, will help 
to cope with ageing-related challenges.
BOX 1: SCENARIOS FEATURED IN SECTION 1
Central scenario: This represents the future of the EU-28 population assuming slightly increasing fertility4 
and flows of approximately 2 000 000 immigrants from third countries into the EU every year. Medium 
assumptions on mortality and education levels, includes intra-EU mobility and uses the recent average for 
migration rates (2013-2016).
Zero international migration scenario (ZIM): No migration to/from the EU; intra-EU mobility between EU-
28 countries is included.
High immigration scenario: Immigration from third countries to the EU is doubled compared to the central 
scenario. It assumes an immigration level of 4 000 000 people every year, which is about two times the 
2013-2016 level. Emigration rates are the same as in the central scenario.
ZIM plus 10%, 25% and 50% fertility: This is the zero international migration scenario, plus an increase 
(10%, 25% and 50%) in the fertility rate of the central scenario after 2020.
POPULATION 
AGEING 
IN EUROPE 
 1.1  Population ageing and old-age 
dependency 
Population ageing is widely considered a challenge 
for the future of the EU’s economic and social 
security systems. Specifically, the EU would face 
a growing burden from care and pensions as well 
as a projected decrease in the labour force size. 
Population ageing results from the combined 
effects of trends in fertility, mortality and 
migration. Increasing longevity is unquestionably 
a valuable achievement of human development, 
and continuing improvement in life expectancy 
is without doubt a universally supported target. 
Life expectancy at birth in the EU averages about 
81 years, nine years more than the global average. 
While measures of population ageing typically use 
age 65 as the ‘elderly’ threshold, it has recently 
been suggested that the age range in which people 
are considered active should be raised as people 
are living longer and are more productive for 
longer. Moreover, in several Member States, the 
statutory retirement age is already over 65 and it is 
expected to increase further on the basis of current 
legislation. In line with this approach, people would 
not be considered ‘elderly’ when they reach 65, but 
rather when they reach the age at which remaining 
life expectancy is 15 years or less (Sanderson and 
Scherbov 2005, 2007, 2010, 2013). In this report,  
for simplicity’s sake, we still refer to the conventional 
definition of working age as being 20-64 years.
Could either more migrants or more children slow 
down the process of population ageing in the long 
run? In political discussions, some see migration as 
a remedy for the perceived problems of population 
ageing, whilst others believe the remedy lies in 
higher birth rates and support for larger families. 
As we will show in this section, these two remedies 
appear to have different consequences  
on population size and age structure. For example, 
although substantial immigration has an 
immediate impact on the size of the working-age 
population, its impact on the age structure  
is less significant in the long run because 
immigrants also grow older. While some 
immigrants may return to their countries of origin, 
past experience indicates that a majority of retiring 
immigrants in the EU will remain in the long term. 
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Neither higher fertility 
nor more migration 
will stop population 
ageing, but more 
productive lives are 
helping to meet the 
related challenges.
Figure 1.1: Population size of EU-28 in 2015-2060, by scenario
Source: CEPAM
In contrast, policies aimed at directly or indirectly 
increasing fertility (for example, by promoting 
work-life balance), if effective, would offer the 
labour force long-term benefits taking effect  
in 20-25 years. In the short-term, higher fertility 
leads to greater dependency on the labour force  
by increasing the share of dependent children in 
the population. This can create a temporary decline 
in labour-force participation if parents leave work 
to take on childcare. For comparison,  
an increase in the total fertility rate (TFR) by 0.1 
child per woman in the EU-25 would have nearly 
the same effect on the old-age dependency ratio 
as an additional 375 000 immigrants per year  
by 2050 (Lutz and Scherbov 2007).
Bearing in mind these considerations, we use six 
scenarios to demonstrate the impact of different 
fertility and migration trajectories on the EU’s 
total and working-age population until 2060. 
These scenarios are: a central scenario, a zero 
international migration scenario (ZIM), a high 
immigration scenario, and three fertility scenarios 
(ZIM +10%, ZIM +25%, ZIM +50%), as described  
in box 1. By juxtaposing the three assumptions  
of fertility: 10%, 25% and 50% higher fertility than 
the central and ZIM scenarios, we can measure 
the effect of increased fertility and distinguish it 
from the effect of migration. To measure the effect 
of migration, we compare the ZIM scenario with 
the central and high immigration scenarios. In this 
section, the focus is on the impact of the amount 
of immigration and the fertility rates. Other factors, 
such as the immigrants’ educational composition 
and labour-market participation, are examined later 
in Sections 2 and 3.
 1.2  The impact of the scenarios  
on the total EU population 
Despite perceptions of a shrinking population,  
the EU is expected to grow further if recent trends 
continue. As shown in figure 1.1, under the central 
scenario, the EU’s population would grow from 
508.5 million in 2015 to around 521 million by 
2060, which is an increase of 2.5%.5 The working-
age population would decrease from 306  
to 256 million people – a decrease of 16% –  
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Figure 1.2: Working-age population (20-64) of EU-28 in 2015-2060, by scenario
Source: CEPAM
and the proportion of the population aged 65 
and over would grow from 19% to 32%. This 
means that by 2060, for every 100 people of 
working age there would be 114 of non-working 
age, predominantly 65 years and older. Under 
the central scenario, the number of births would 
decrease from 26 million in 2015-2020 to 24 
million in 2055-2060, given the lower number  
of women of childbearing age.
In the ZIM scenario, the EU population would reduce 
by roughly 9%, to 466 million people by 2060, 
bringing it to the same size as in the 1980s. In the 
short term, the scenario would produce a smaller 
working-age population by almost 30% (to 222 
million by 2060), as shown in figure 1.2. However, 
in the long term, the difference between the central 
and the ZIM scenario is only minor because migrants 
also age. With zero international migration the share 
of 65+ would be 34% in 2060, which is only  
2 percentage points higher than the central scenario. 
For every 100 people of working age, there would 
be 118 of non-working age, which is 4 percentage 
points higher than in the central scenario. 
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As regards the fertility scenarios, increasing 
fertility by 10% (approximately 0.2 children per 
woman) while assuming zero migration generates 
a smaller total population than in the central 
scenario. A 25% increase in fertility (approx. 
0.4 children per woman), bringing the TFR to 
replacement level6, means that the EU population 
would increase by 2.8% to reach 521 million 
people in 2060 (a similar trend to the central 
scenario). A 50% increase in fertility (about 0.85, 
increasing the TFR to a rather unlikely 2.6 children 
per woman) would generate a faster population 
increase than the central scenario and would 
encounter a steeper increase after 2050 when  
the larger cohorts of births would reach 
reproductive age. By 2060, this scenario would 
see around 580 million people living in the EU. 
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 1.3  The impact of the fertility scenarios 
on the EU’s working-age population
In terms of the effect on the size of the working-age 
population, the three fertility scenarios in figure 
1.2 show that the size would decline at the same 
pace until 2040 – that is, until babies currently being 
born start to reach working age. Only the ZIM +50% 
scenario would have a larger working-age population 
than the central scenario, and then only after 2050. 
Under this scenario, the total EU population would 
grow by nearly 75 million people by 2060. However, 
such a fertility rate has not been seen in most EU 
countries since the 1970s.
 1.4  The impact of the fertility scenarios 
on the EU’s 65+ population
Table 1.1 compares the population structure 
indicators in all six scenarios: the share of 65+  
in the total population and the total age-
dependency ratios. For ZIM +50%, the share  
of 65+ would increase from 19% to 27% in 2040 
and remain stable until 2060. The total age-
dependency ratio would reach 130, which means 
that for every person of working age there would 
be 1.3 dependants. This is because it also includes 
an increase in the number of births by almost 70% 
to 43.5 million in 2060. 
Year
Central  
scenario
ZIM
ZIM +10% 
fertility
ZIM +25% 
fertility
ZIM +50% 
fertility
High immigration 
scenario
% POPULATION 65+
2015 19 19 19 19 19 19
2040 28 30 29 28 27 26
2060 32 34 33 30 27 29
TOTAL AGE-DEPENDENCY RATIO
2015 76 76 76 76 76 76
2040 99 103 106 112 121 93 
2060 114 118 122 125 130 104
Table 1.1: Share of population aged 65 and above and the total age-dependency ratio in 2015, 
2040 and 2060 in the EU-28, by scenario.
ZIM = Zero International Migration
Total age dependency ratio = a ratio between the economically inactive (age 0-19 and 65+) and working age population (age 20-64)
Source: CEPAM
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 1.5  Impact of the high immigration 
scenario on the size of the EU’s 
working-age and 65+ populations
Therefore, it appears that even with higher fertility, 
the non-working-age population would be above 
the current levels while the working-age population 
would continue to decline. Can more migration 
counteract such a decline? The high immigration 
scenario, which is equivalent to doubling 2013-2016 
migration flows to 20 million coming into the EU 
every 5 years, would increase the EU’s population 
size by almost 25%, reaching about 632 million 
people by 2060 (see figure 1.1). There would also 
be a higher number of births due to more people 
of reproductive age, from 27 million in 2015-2020 
to almost 30 million in 2055-2060. With high 
immigration, the total age-dependency ratio would 
reach 104 people by 2060 compared to 114 in the 
central scenario. However, the high immigration 
scenario would only moderately reduce the pace  
of ageing. The proportion of the 65+ population will 
increase, from 19% in 2015 to 29% in 2060. This  
is only 2 percentage points lower than the proportion 
obtained under the central scenario assumptions. 
 1.6 Conclusions
A number of conclusions can be made from our 
findings. First, increasing the number of births,  
even by means of successful government initiatives,  
is not an instant remedy for population ageing  
in the EU. An increase in fertility to the replacement 
level of about 2 children per woman from 2020 
onwards would not completely prevent the EU 
working-age population from declining in size. 
Although the pace of ageing would be slower and the 
total population size would stabilise, such an increase 
would still lead to higher total dependency ratios.
Secondly, more immigration from third countries 
into the EU would have an immediate effect on the 
total size of the EU population and the working-
age population. However, even with double the 
immigration levels of 2013-16, immigration 
would make little improvement in the long-term 
on reducing the proportion of people of non-
working age relative to those of working age (as 
conventionally defined by ages 20-64). This is 
due to the fact that immigrants inevitably grow 
older, retire from work and require social benefits 
(e.g. pensions), just like non-immigrants. In short, 
increasing immigration or fertility will not stop the 
population from ageing, reflecting a trend that is 
happening not only in the EU, but in almost every 
country worldwide.
These two conclusions can help to illustrate  
the impact of possible policy options. For example, 
substantial investment in work-life balance 
initiatives (including tax incentives, child allowances, 
day-care access and family-friendly work 
arrangements) sustained over time have created  
an environment conducive to higher fertility close  
to the replacement level in some EU Member States, 
such as France. Similarly, increasing the number  
of immigrants would theoretically be possible.  
For this, there would be political, social and 
economic issues to consider, and well-designed 
integration policies would be required to enable 
smooth immigration and successful job matching. 
Bearing in mind that the above options are based 
on scenarios, it is important for policymakers 
today to consider the possibility that neither 
increased fertility rates nor migration are the 
panacea for the perceived problems associated 
with Europe’s ageing population. Solutions must 
have a broader, multidimensional demographic 
perspective, taking into account levels of education 
and labour-force participation. In fact, the most 
effective remedy would be to increase labour-force 
participation, rather than looking to either migration 
or fertility. The next section goes in this direction 
by showing how higher labour-force participation 
can compensate for a decreasing working-age 
population – an unavoidable demographic reality  
EU Member States will have to face in the 
coming decades.
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SIZE AND 
EDUCATION LEVELS 
OF THE FUTURE 
EU LABOUR FORCE 
2: Size and education levels of the future EU labour force
SUMMARY
The EU labour force is transforming amid social development and the ageing process. 
This section projects a smaller and more educated labour force in the future. In light 
of the context, a possible decline in labour force size may not be an economic problem 
if future jobs are fewer in number and require higher skills. At the same time, this 
section considers scenarios that test how greater labour-force participation could 
not only stem the tide of a decreasing working-age population, but also reduce the 
expected increase in the dependency ratio. 
The constant participation scenario acts as the reference trajectory, which charts 
the expected path of a shrinking labour force and a rising dependency ratio. We 
then introduce the equalisation and Swedish scenarios to see how increasing 
labour-participation rates in the EU can help offset this trajectory. An increase in 
female labour-force participation and longer productive lives could stabilise the size 
of the labour force and dependency ratio at current levels.
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BOX 2: SCENARIOS FEATURED IN SECTION 2, BASED ON CEPAM’S SSP DEVELOPMENT 
PATHWAYS (PAGE 58)
Constant participation scenario: Participation rates of the EU’s labour force by age, sex, country, and edu-
cation level are at current levels. Assumes medium fertility, mortality, education development, and migration 
(long-term average).
Equalisation scenario: Member State-specific labour force participation rates of women reach those 
of men by 2060.
Swedish scenario: All labour-force participation rates in all EU Member States gradually converge to those 
currently in Sweden by 2060.
SIZE AND 
EDUCATION LEVELS 
OF THE FUTURE 
EU LABOUR FORCE 
 2.1 The demographic transition 
Historically, the EU population has gone from 
having high fertility and high mortality rates 
to stable, below replacement fertility and low 
mortality, as part of the universal process known 
as the demographic transition. At the end of the 
transition, population growth rates either stabilise 
or reverse. While there are fewer births and longer 
life expectancies, young people are becoming more 
educated and entering the labour market later. 
Such developments will inevitably shape the size  
of the EU’s future labour force and its distribution 
by level of education.  
Despite population ageing, a smaller, higher-
skilled labour force may be poised to complement 
the possible changing needs of the future labour 
market (Cedefop 2016). Furthermore, getting more 
women into the labour force and having longer 
working lives as Swedes already have today, has 
the potential to nullify the shrinking  
of the working-age population over time.
 2.2  A smaller but more-educated  
labour force
Under the constant participation scenario,  
the total size of the labour force is projected  
to change from 245.8 million to 214.1 million over 
the next four decades, as illustrated in figure 2.1. 
This decrease is solely attributable to there being 
fewer workers with low (primary education)  
and middle education (upper secondary and below). 
Projected decreases in the size of the labour force 
come from the population with low (from 50.7 
to 14.0 million) and middle (from 108.2 to 74.2 
million) levels of education.
At the same time, the number of workers with 
a short post-secondary education (such as 
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Higher female  
labour-force 
participation  
and longer productive 
lives have the power 
to stabilise the 
labour-force size  
and dependency ratio.
Figure 2.1: EU labour force by education level, the constant participation scenario, 2015-2060 
Source: CEPAM 
technical training), a bachelor’s, a master’s degree 
or higher, are rising, not just in relation to their 
proportion to the overall labour force, but also  
in absolute terms. Significantly, these post-
secondary groups are expected to increase  
by almost a half (+45%) over the next 40 years. 
Therefore, irrespective of changes in the 
population’s age structure and labour force sizes,  
it can be expected that the human capital of future 
workers of any age, measured by the highest level 
of their educational attainment, will be higher than 
today. This is because in all Member States, young 
people are already better educated than their 
elders and will gradually replace them through  
the process called ‘demographic metabolism’.
 2.3  How different rates of labour 
participation impact on the size  
of the total labour force 
The three scenarios in figure 2.2 illustrate how 
the divergent labour force participation rates 
influence the size of the labour force over time. 
All three assume the same demographic future 
as the constant participation scenario (see figure 
2.1). Under the constant participation scenario, 
the labour force size would be about 13% smaller 
than it is today (from 245 million to just under 215 
million). Under the equalisation scenario, the size 
of the labour force would decline to 227.2 million 
in 2060, which represents about 13 million more 
workers than under the constant participation 
scenario. Furthermore, if participation rates rise  
to the levels currently observed in Sweden  
(the Swedish scenario), the labour force size  
would stabilise at 245 million workers, avoiding  
any decline. Both the equalisation  
and the Swedish scenarios express the high 
capacity that participation rates – in particular 
female participation – have to affect the labour 
force size. In fact, participation rates can impact 
the size of the labour force notably more than 
increasing migration flows.7
Looking at EU Member States more closely, under 
the constant participation and Swedish scenarios, 
map 2.1 shows that under the former, the size 
of the labour force in many Western Member 
States would remain stable, due in part to gaining 
working-age nationals from Eastern Member 
States. In turn, Eastern and Southern EU Member 
States would continue to see reductions in the size 
of their labour force.8
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Figure 2.2: The three scenarios influencing the size of the EU’s total labour force, 2015-2060 
Source: CEPAM
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Map 2.1:  Changes in the size of the labour force 2015-2060 under the constant participation  
and Swedish scenarios 
Source: CEPAM
Created with mapchart.net©
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 2.4  How lower labour-force dependency 
ratios can reduce the public 
spending burden
When it comes to considering future public 
spending on pensions, social services, etc.  
for the non-working population, it is important  
to look at the labour-force dependency ratio (LFDR). 
This measure is important for understanding the 
potential economic impact of population ageing, 
since the higher the ratio, the more challenges 
there are to labour markets, government tax, 
government spending and the wider economy. 
In 2015, the LFDR was 1.05, meaning that 
there were about 105 inactive people for every 
100 workers. With the constant participation 
scenario, in figure 2.3, the LFDR would reach 
1.36 in 2060. However, ratios would vary a lot  
by Member State, as seen in map 2.2. They would 
be much higher in Member States experiencing 
low fertility, higher life expectancy and low 
labour-force participation, such as Greece (1.69) 
and Italy (1.72). On the other hand, Member 
States with medium or high fertility and a higher 
labour-force participation rate would have more 
favourable ratios, such as Sweden (1.04)  
and Denmark (1.05).
Changes in labour-force participation rates could 
significantly impact the projected LFDR. In the 
equalisation scenario in figure 2.3, the ratio  
would stabilise at about 1.2, which reduces to half 
the expected increases compared to the constant 
participation scenario, meaning it is a more 
favourable scenario. In the Swedish scenario,  
the ratio would stabilise to the level of what  
it was in 2015. In other words, a strong but realistic 
increase – it is already reality in Sweden – of labour 
force participation over time could nullify a large 
part of the negative future economic consequences 
of population ageing. So, it is clear that labour force 
participation rates have the highest potential  
to mitigate the challenges of population ageing. 
Figure 2.3: EU labour-force dependency ratio, by scenario, 2015-2060 
Source: CEPAM 
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 2.5 Conclusions
The EU’s future labour force is likely to be smaller 
but better educated. The impact of the decline  
in the size of the labour force could be lessened  
by an increase in productivity thanks to a  
more educated labour force. Plus, incentives  
to encourage more women to participate in the 
labour force and to get everybody to participate  
in the labour force, as observed in Sweden, could 
also prevent its decline and could stabilise the 
LFDR. The combined effect of increasing labour-
force participation and worker productivity could 
enable economic growth to continue, thereby 
offsetting public spending on dependant people. 
Overall in the EU, the total cost of ageing (public 
spending on pensions, health care, long-term care, 
education and unemployment benefits)  
is expected to increase by 1.7 percentage points  
to 26.7% of GDP between 2016 and 2070 
(European Commission, 2018a). Thus, the scenarios 
projected in this section are important for EU 
policymakers to consider. In the context of this 
challenge and covering the extra 1.7% of GDP,  
a higher educated labour force will need  
to be utilised. Policymakers should ensure that  
the education system is responsive to the needs of 
the job market and the changing nature of work, so 
that increasingly highly educated young people can 
contribute to the economy and actualise the higher 
potential productivity that comes with education.
Map 2.2: Labour-force dependency ratio, constant participation scenario, 2060 
Source: CEPAM
Labour-force dependency ratio (LFDR) = a ratio between people in the labour force and people not in the labour force.
Created with mapchart.net©  
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    In the 
context of 
ageing and extra 
public spending, 
policymakers should 
ensure that  
the education system 
is responsive 
to the job market
Migration narratives for Section 3 scenarios 32
Low Volume – High 
Human Capital of 
Immigrants (similar to 
Japan in recent years)
EU Member States adopt more selective 
migration policies to both emphasise 
skills and substantially reduce the overall 
volume of flows. Immigrants are admitted 
primarily based on their potential  
for contributing to the economy, using  
a points system to target highly specialised 
and needed skills.
The number of immigrants settling  
in the EU amounts to approximately 1.2 
million every 5 years (corresponding to the 
recent immigration rate in Japan, which 
would mean that flows reduce to about 
12% of the volume of the past 5 years). 
Integration into the labour market is 
facilitated by the highly skilled profiles and 
screening for other criteria. Member States 
maintain the system’s integrity by enforcing 
rules on employment and penalising 
businesses for unlawful hiring practices.
Dealing with an ageing workforce, 
policymakers in this narrative address 
challenges by investing in automation  
and mechanisation. The new focus intends 
to use emerging technologies to improve 
production efficiency and reduce the 
dependence of various sectors (agriculture, 
heavy industry, etc.) on repetitive, low-skilled 
labour, suitable for automation. Similarly, 
the health-care system reduces the risks 
of labour shortages by using technologies 
to improve health-care services, emulating 
existing best practices used abroad.
MIGRATION NARRATIVES 
FOR SECTION 3 SCENARIOS
Low Volume – Low  
Human Capital of 
Immigrants (low-skilled, 
circular system)  
A reform of the education system benefits 
EU Member States by successfully linking 
university and technical programmes  
to economic needs. With a more efficient 
education-to-labour-force path, Member 
States do not aim to supplement their 
labour force by recruiting large numbers  
of immigrants from third countries. Instead, 
the primary focus of migration policy shifts 
to temporary refugee assistance and filling 
remaining low-skilled jobs, with flows  
at around 1.2 million every 5 years.
A new migration system is implemented 
with a focus on work permits of a temporary 
and seasonal nature. Such changes  
to labour migration create more circular, 
rather than permanent movement,  
in part to address mounting concerns from 
developing countries of ‘brain drain’ losses. 
Member States also adjust asylum policies 
accordingly. 
The general orderly management and low 
volume of immigrants do not overload 
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relevant support resources. At the same 
time, permits for low-skilled immigrants and 
temporary workers are calibrated to match 
unfilled jobs, facilitating their entry into the 
labour force. The new system depends on 
regular monitoring of the economy, efficient 
administration of set migration levels,  
and ensuring that those employing 
temporary workers fulfil legal work 
requirements as protection against fraud.
High Volume – High 
Human Capital  
of Immigrants  
EU Member States begin recruiting 
increasing numbers of highly skilled workers 
from countries around the world to address 
economic concerns. The introduction  
of a new high-volume, highly skilled 
immigration system brings approximately  
20 million migrants into the EU every 
five years (corresponding to the recent 
immigration rate in Canada, which would 
mean that flows double the volume  
of the past five years). Maintaining its highly 
selective nature, the system relies on the 
enforcement of work permits and border 
checks as the EU becomes an increasingly 
prominent immigration destination.
Most of the new immigrants originate from 
middle-income countries with relatively 
strong education systems, although  
the system also attracts the highly educated 
elite from low-income countries. In turn, 
sending countries struggle with the losses of 
their most talented and educated citizens as 
the EU’s appetite for skilled workers persists.
Integration into the economic system 
comes without significant barriers, since 
the admission of migrants is a function 
of scoring highly on criteria for education, 
skills, language ability and work experience. 
A large proportion of immigrants pursue 
opportunities in the urban economic hubs  
of Western and Northern EU, given  
the greater demand for highly skilled 
workers as well as their own personal 
preferences and existing migrant networks. 
This narrative is similar to the model 
currently used in Canada.
• The Canadian immigration programme 
is a merit-based system that recognises 
three broad classes of immigrants: 
economic migrants, sponsored family 
and refugees. Immigration targets 
are established for all immigration 
categories and subcategories, and are 
set at the federal level, in agreement 
with provincial authorities. Targets 
are estimations of future immigration 
influx and as such are not considered 
as quotas.11 
• Between 2007 and 2016, the Canadian 
government granted permanent 
residency to 2 600 000 immigrants, 
60% of whom were economic migrants 
chosen for their potential ability  
to integrate in the Canadian labour 
market.12 In this context, dependants  
of economic migrants are also classified 
as economic migrants. 
• Most economic migrants are admitted 
based on a selection grid assessing 
their skills and human capital, such as 
education level, previous work experience 
and fluency in Canada’s official 
languages, French and English. Furthermore, 
economic migrants may be admitted 
as permanent residents under sub-
programmes targeted at individuals with 
specific characteristics, such as investors, 
entrepreneurs or individuals  
with previous work experience in Canada.
• Aside from programmes leading  
to permanent residency, Canada has 
schemes to provide temporary work permits 
to foreign nationals. The number of holders 
of temporary work permits increased 
significantly during the last decade, doubling 
from 173 000 in 2007 to 340 000  
in 2016.13 
• There are two programmes for refugees. 
The first is the Refugee and Humanitarian 
Resettlement Program, for people requiring 
protection from outside Canada (about 
65% of refugees according to the 2019 
target). The second one is the In-Canada 
Asylum Program for people making refugee 
protection claims from within Canada.  
The United Nations Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR), along with private sponsors, 
identifies refugees for resettlement.  
A person cannot apply directly to Canada 
for resettlement. In 2019, refugees are 
expected to account for approximately  
15% of the total number of migrants.  
High Volume – Low 
Human Capital 
of Immigrants
 
In the face of persistent conflict, instability 
and poverty in the EU neighbourhood, and 
increasing costs of securing the external 
borders, EU Member States decide to expand 
the intake of low-skilled labour and adopt 
more generous asylum policies (in terms of 
determining safe countries, allocating resources 
and acceptance rates). Many Member States 
aim for the highest migration-granting rates of 
recent years, focusing less on skill selection or 
border enforcement.
Intensifying push factors create conditions for 
a constant supply of immigrants as tens of 
millions of the developing world’s impoverished 
look abroad to make their livelihoods. 
Furthermore, the EU is seen as an ever-more 
viable destination by prospective immigrants, 
encouraging a sustained exodus. Overall, 
migrant flows into the EU as a whole reach 20 
million every 5 years (about double the volume 
compared to the past 5 years), progressively 
characterised by greater proportions of low-
skilled workers, as well as refugees and family 
reunification cases.
Integrating them into the labour market 
becomes an important topic in public discourse 
as record numbers of immigrants are given 
permission to live and work in the EU. Most 
arriving immigrants tend to have a lower skills 
profile compared to the EU average, presenting 
barriers to their potential labour-market 
participation. Due to more plentiful economic 
opportunities, personal preferences, historical 
links and existing communities, the majority of 
migrants choose to live in Western, Northern, 
and a couple of Southern Member States.
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SUMMARY
Policymakers regularly balance migration policy with a Member State’s best interests 
– doing so while being mindful of the fact that a long-term understanding of 
demography is crucial. At the core of such considerations are factors including: the 
volume of immigrants from third countries entering the Member State, their levels 
of education, how well they will integrate into the labour market, and how effective 
the Member State is at enforcing migration policy. This section shows how different 
volumes of immigration and the integration by immigrants into the labour market 
change the educational composition of the future EU labour force and the LFDR ratio. 
Whilst a high volume of immigration would increase the size of the EU’s total labour 
force, it would have a limited impact on the proportion of workers to non-workers in 
the long-run. Larger inflows combined with deteriorating economic integration could 
actually result in a labour force situation that is worse than that with medium or low 
volumes of immigration, highlighting the importance of effective integration efforts.
BOX 3: ADD-ON SCENARIOS TO THE MIGRATION NARRATIVES FEATURED IN SECTION 3 
(SEE PAGES: 32-34)
Baseline labour-force integration scenario: Uses gender- and country-specific parameters for migrants 
(by education, duration of stay and age at arrival) and native-born, as observed for the period 2010-2015).
Low integration scenario: Assumes that by 2040 all countries will have converged to the worst labour-force 
integration observed in the EU-28.
High integration scenario: Assumes that the labour-force participation rate for immigrants will equal that 
of the native-born by 2040.
Baseline volume scenario: Uses the short-term average for migration to the EU; medium 
assumptions of mortality, education levels, and intra-EU mobility.
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IMPACTS 
OF MIGRATION 
ON THE EU 
LABOUR FORCE 
 3.1 Migration scenarios 
First, to assess the different volumes of immigrants 
and their human capital, we constructed four 
migration scenarios which are based on different 
qualitative narratives (see box 3) : (a) low volume 
– high human capital of immigrants; (b) low 
volume – low human capital of immigrants; (c) 
high volume – high human capital of immigrants; 
and (d) high volume – low human capital  
of immigrants.9 These scenarios are illustrated 
in figure 3.1. Then we combined them with three 
different labour-force integration scenarios: 
baseline, low integration and the high integration 
scenario (defined in box 3).
By combining these migration scenarios with 
labour-force integration scenarios it is possible  
to analyse the impact of the volume of immigrants, 
their levels of education and of integration on the 
EU’s labour force size, its educational composition, 
and its LFDR
 3.2  Current labour-force participation  
of immigrants
To understand how the integration scenarios affect 
the EU labour force, we first need to look at  
the current levels of participation by immigrants  
in the labour market, as shown in figure 3.2. 
Recently arrived male immigrants tend  
to participate much less than native-born 
populations. Over time, their labour force 
participation rate (LFPR) tends to increase  
as the duration of stay in the host country 
increases. On average, after a 10-year stay, 
participation rates for male immigrants are  
only slightly lower than those of the native-born.
The dynamics of labour-force integration vary 
widely among EU Member States. In Germany, 
Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands there  
is a large gap in LFPR between the native-born  
and immigrants, even for those who have been  
in their host country for a decade. Conversely, LFPR 
High migration 
volumes increase 
labour-force size but 
have a limited effect 
on the number of 
dependent people 
per worker in the EU.
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for the native-born and male immigrants, even 
recent ones, are similar to one another in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal.
Gender disparities in LFPR are more prominent 
among immigrants than between native-born men 
and women. Female immigrants are the least likely 
to participate in the labour force as their LFPRs are 
lower than both male immigrants and native-born 
men. Moreover, female immigrants have not yet 
caught up with the LFPR of native-born women 
in any EU Member State.
The positive relationship that education has with 
LFPR is weaker for immigrants than for those who 
are native-born, especially for female immigrants. 
Immigrants who arrived during childhood, however, 
tend to have more similar outcomes to those who 
are native-born, having gone through schooling  
in the host Member State. 
 3.3  The impact of different volumes of 
immigrants on the size of the future 
EU labour force 
The number of immigrants admitted into the EU 
would strongly alter the overall population size 
and thus the labour-force size. As shown in table 
3.1, where the volume of immigrants is high (and 
there is high integration), there could be around 
30% more workers in the labour force by 2060 
compared to the baseline scenario, and 60% more 
workers compared to the low-volume scenarios. 
This high volume of migration would lead to 
significant growth in the labour force size in terms 
of absolute numbers.
In addition to migration volume, integration 
dynamics have a significant impact on the EU's 
future labour force size. If migration volumes are 
high, the stakes of integrating into the labour force 
are much higher. For instance, table 3.1 shows 
that the difference between the high volume of 
immigrants and high integration (between 300-310 
million people) and high immigration and low 
Figure 3.1:  The migration scenarios, contrasting volumes of migrants with their level  
of human capital  
Source: CEPAM
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Figure 3.2:  Labour-force participation rate* in the EU by migration status, age at arrival  
and duration of stay, 2010-2015 
Source: CEPAM
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integration (264-271 million people) can vary  
by around 14%, whereas the difference between 
the low volume of immigrants and high integration 
(between 171-172 million) and low immigration  
and low integration (168-169 million) is far less  
at around 2%.
Because immigrants’ labour-force participation 
varies much less according to education than  
it does for a Member State’s native-born (or host 
population), the effect of the immigrants’ level  
of education on the projected labour-force size  
is limited. Under both a medium volume  
and baseline integration situation, the high-
education assumption (of 229 million people) only 
results in 3 million more workers (1.3%) relative  
to the medium-education assumption (226 million).
As table 3.1 indicates, a high volume  
of immigration will lead to more people  
in the labour force than the number currently, 
irrespective of their level of education or how  
well they integrate into the labour market. However, 
not only does this mean that there will be a larger 
labour force, but that there would also be a larger 
non-working population, partly because immigrants 
tend to have lower participation rates than natives, 
particularly female immigrants. Immigration also 
causes growth of the non-active population  
in the long run as immigrants age and leave  
the workforce. Most importantly, as discussed later 
in this section, it must be noted that the size  
of the labour force is neither a good indicator  
of economic health nor a way to address  
population ageing.
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 3.4  The impact of different volumes 
of immigrants on the educational 
composition of the future EU 
labour force
In Section 2, it has been projected that, by 2060, 
the EU’s labour force will be better educated than 
it is now. Table 3.2 shows that the proportion of 
workers with post-secondary education could reach 
between 40% and 52% in 2060, compared to 35% 
in 2015.
Unless migrants are highly prioritised according to 
their education level, higher volumes of migration 
tend to decrease the proportion of workers with 
post-secondary education.10 As shown in table 3.2, 
in cases where migrants’ educational composition 
is at the medium level, the EU’s proportion of 
post-secondary workers is highest (51%) when the 
volume of migrants is low; 48% when the volume 
is at its baseline; and 45% when the volume is high. 
The declining proportion of post-secondary workers 
in the EU – moving from low to high volumes of 
immigrants – is because, on average, immigrants 
tend to have a lower level of education than those 
who are native-born. 
When the volume of immigrants is high, their 
educational composition would significantly alter 
the future educational composition of the labour 
force in the EU as a whole. For example, within 
the high-volume scenarios in table 3.2, a strong 
selection for highly educated immigrants would 
lead to 53% of workers in the EU with post-
secondary education. However, if a high volume 
of immigrants with low education entered the EU 
labour force, the proportion of the labour force with 
post-secondary education would decrease to 41%. 
In contrast, where immigrant educational levels are 
more moderate and the volume of immigrants is 
low, this would have a smaller impact on the overall 
education composition of the EU labour force with 
post-secondary education. 
Furthermore, the integration assumptions (high 
and low) influence the absolute number of 
workers with post-secondary education to an 
extent, but have a very limited impact on their 
Immigration  
volume
Educational  
composition  
of immigrants
Integration assumptions
Low Baseline High
Low
Low 168 170 171
Medium 168 170 171
High 168 171 172
Baseline
Low 212 224 231
Medium 214 226 233
High 217 229 237
High
Low 264 287 300
Medium 265 289 302
High 271 295 310
LABOUR FORCE IN 2015 = 245
Table 3.1: Projected labour force size (in millions) of the EU in 2060
Source: CEPAM
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Immigration  
volume
Educational  
composition  
of immigrants
Integration assumptions
Low Baseline High
Low
Low 51% 50% 50%
Medium 51% 51% 51%
High 52% 52% 52%
Baseline
Low 46% 45% 44%
Medium 48% 48% 47%
High 52% 53% 53%
High
Low 42% 41% 40%
Medium 46% 45% 45%
High 53% 53% 54%
PROPORTION IN 2015 = 35%
Table 3.2:  Projected proportion of the labour force with post-secondary education  
in the EU in 2060 
Source: CEPAM
proportion relative to other education groups in 
the overall workforce.
 3.5  The impact of different volumes 
of migration on the labour-force 
dependency ratio
Although higher immigration volumes have 
a large impact on increasing the labour-force size, 
their impact on the LFDR is much smaller. Table 
3.3 shows that under the medium-education 
composition and baseline integration assumptions, 
a high volume of immigrants only manages to 
decrease the LFDR by 0.06, compared to the 
baseline scenario (1.27 vs. 1.33).
Under all combinations of immigrant volumes, 
levels of education and integration assumptions, 
the LFDR would be higher than in 2015 (1.08) due 
to the unstoppable momentum of an increasing 
average age. This is partially because immigrants 
make up a relatively small proportion of the 
population and therefore have limited ability to 
affect the overall population, age structure or lower 
participation rates. In any case, as table 3.3 shows, 
migrants add to both the overall active and inactive 
populations in the long-run.
The integration assumptions, however, have a larger 
impact on the LFDR than the actual volumes of 
immigrants. Table 3.3 shows that, under the high-
volume and medium-level educational compositions, 
the ratio reaches 1.17 with high integration and 
climbs to 1.48 if integration is unsuccessful. 
Furthermore, low immigration and high integration 
yields a better LFDR than high immigration and low 
integration (1.39 vs. 1.48). Similarly, moving from 
medium to high integration has a similar effect on 
the LFDR as high-volume immigration flows with 
baseline integration rates (1.26 vs. 1.27). In other 
words, the impact of immigration on the labour force 
depends largely on the immigrants’ ability to access 
the labour market rather than on the volume of 
immigrants.
Variations in the educational composition of the 
volumes of immigrants have a smaller impact 
on the LFDR. For most combinations concerning 
the volumes of immigration and integration 
assumptions, the three educational composition 
variants do not significantly influence the LFDR. 
However, they matter for the productivity-weighted 
LFDR (not shown here) which takes account of the 
fact that more educated people tend to earn higher 
salaries and thus pay more into the system.  
These economic aspects go beyond the scope 
of this scenario exercise but deserve in-depth  
follow-up research.
 3.6 Conclusions
This section has considered how the different 
volumes of immigration and their various levels of 
integration into the labour force impact the size of 
the EU’s future labour force, the proportion of post-
secondary education in the future EU labour force, 
and the LFDR by 2060.
A number of key findings can be asserted. First, 
high volumes of immigration would increase 
labour force size in the EU, but would have a very 
limited impact on the LFDR, which is in line with 
the findings of a recent OECD study (Spielvogel 
and Meghnagi 2018). Therefore, a larger labour 
force size will not necessarily curb or reduce the 
number of non-working people depending on the 
labour force, which undoubtedly has repercussions 
on economic growth and public spending, as 
mentioned in Section 2.  
Even though immigrants tend to be younger on 
average than those who are native-born, the 
positive effect on the labour market is short-lived, 
in part because the participation rate of immigrants 
is lower than that of native-born, particularly for 
female immigrants. In the long run – regardless of 
the LFPRs – higher volumes of immigration would 
not only increase the working population but also 
the population of non-workers too as immigrants 
inevitably age, leave the labour force and require 
social assistance, as do native-born workers. 
Integration dynamics have a significant impact on 
the EU’s future labour force size. Consequently, 
to maximise the possible impact of immigration 
on lowering the LFDR, any increase in the 
Immigration  
volume
Educational  
composition  
of immigrants
Integration assumptions
Low Baseline High
Low
Low 1.44 1.41 1.39
Medium 1.44 1.41 1.39
High 1.43 1.41 1.39
Baseline
Low 1.47 1.34 1.28
Medium 1.46 1.33 1.26
High 1.43 1.30 1.22
High
Low 1.50 1.29 1.20
Medium 1.48 1.27 1.17
High 1.43 1.24 1.12
VALUE IN 2015 = 1.08
Table 3.3: Projected EU labour-force dependency ratio in 2060
Source: CEPAM
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volume of immigration accepted must come 
with successful policies to improve immigrants’ 
access to the labour market, especially for female 
immigrants. Otherwise, higher inflows combined 
with deteriorating participation rates could result in 
a situation that is worse than that with medium or 
low volumes of immigrants.
Finally, while a careful selection of immigrants 
in terms of levels of education would only have 
a limited impact on both the size of the labour 
force and the LFDR in the EU, this matters 
greatly for the human capital of the immigrant 
population and thus for the productivity and 
income levels earned by immigrants as a group. 
Also, for other aspects of social, linguistic and 
cultural integration that are beyond the scope of 
this study, immigrants’ education level tends to 
matter greatly because of a steeper learning curve 
in adjusting to new conditions.
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SUMMARY
Movement between EU Member States, or intra-EU mobility, has facilitated population 
changes within the EU in recent decades. Pre-existing economic disparities between 
Member States have encouraged many citizens to search for work in places other than 
their country of origin, likely to the economic benefit of the union as a whole, but not 
necessarily for all sending Member States. 
This section focuses on the potential for change in total population sizes over time, 
leaving the topic of the education-selective nature of such emigration for Section 
5. If flow patterns from the east and south continue, some Member States will see 
significant reductions in their total population. This raises important implications for 
economic development and Cohesion Policy goals.
BOX 4: SCENARIOS FEATURED IN SECTION 4
Central scenario:  Flows of approximately 2 000 000 immigrants from third countries into the EU every 
year. Medium assumptions of mortality, education levels, and uses the recent average for migration. Intra-EU 
mobility rates are held constant leading to fewer emigrants from the main sending Member States, due to 
their smaller and ageing populations. For example, emigration to other EU countries from Poland is projected 
to decline from 903,000 in 2015-2019 to 604 000 in 2055-2060 under this assumption of constant age-spe-
cific emigration rates.
No intra-EU mobility scenario: The assumption of no EU intra-mobility between Member States.
Double intra-EU mobility scenario: This scenario doubles the intra-EU mobility rates used in the 
central scenario.
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IMPACTS 
OF INTERNAL 
EU MOBILITY 
OVER TIME 
 4.1  Intra-EU mobility and EU Member 
State populations 
Between 1991 and 2015, the population of the 
current EU Member States increased from 476.8 
to 508.5 million. As map 4.1 illustrates, in spite of 
low fertility, western and southern14 EU Member 
States experienced marked population growth 
as they attracted immigrants from within and 
outside of the EU. In contrast, Eastern Member 
States experienced population decline due to 
a combination of very low fertility and emigration. 
For example, the Baltic States and Bulgaria lost 
between 26% and 16% of their population, intra-
EU mobility being one of the drivers of this decline.
Intra-EU mobility has played an important role  
in population change in Member States over  
the past decades. In 2017, over 3% of EU citizens 
(16.9 million) resided in a country other than their 
country of citizenship (Eurostat 2018). Since 2004, 
migration among the current Member States 
increased following the accession of 13 countries, 
although transitional restrictions imposed by some 
of the older EU-1515 Member States have affected 
the volume and direction of flows between individual 
Member States. In addition, evidence shows that 
intra-EU mobility stabilises after an initial rise 
following a country’s accession (de Haas 2018). 
Nonetheless, an estimated 1.8% of the population 
in the eastern Member States that joined the EU 
in 2004 moved to the EU-15 between 2004  
and 2009, rising to 4.1% in Bulgaria and Romania 
between 2007 and 2009 (Fic et al. 2011). EU-15 
populations grew by an estimated 0.4% and 0.3% 
due to immigration from new Member States during 
the period (Fic et al. 2011). 
Separate projections of both international  
migration to/from the EU and intra-EU mobility  
are necessary to assess the possible impact  
If internal migration 
flows to western 
Member States 
continue, some in 
the south and east 
will see significant 
declines in their 
populations.
of intra-EU mobility on future population changes 
in EU Member States. Such modelling was 
not normally done in previous EU population 
projections, the only similar projection for the EU 
being Bijak et al. (2007).16 Assessment  
of bilateral flows between the Member States 
is still particularly challenging due to large 
discrepancies in reported in- and outflows between 
the countries. In spite of significant efforts  
by Eurostat to improve data quality, there are 
significant variations in definitions, data-collection 
systems and gaps in information exchange 
between the national statistical offices.17 The data 
which were used to compute the mobility rates  
for the modelling of bilateral flows between the EU 
Member States already include the post-financial 
crisis years when return migration from the eastern 
Member States picked up. Thus, return migration 
is included in the overall rate although we do not 
model it separately. As a consequence, additional 
modelling is needed to arrive at integrated, 
harmonised bilateral flows between the Member 
States. For the purposes of CEPAM, taking into 
account the large discrepancies of in-outflows,  
we estimated intra-EU mobility bilateral flows for 
the period 2009-2016 using the method developed 
by Raymer et al. (2013).18 
The purpose of this section is to assess the impact 
of intra-EU mobility on the EU population. To do 
so, three scenarios were developed: the central 
scenario, the no intra-EU mobility scenario,  
and the double intra-EU mobility scenario.19 
 4.2 Intra-EU mobility scenarios
Keeping international migration into the EU 
constant20 and varying only the magnitude  
of intra-EU mobility, the central scenario  
is juxtaposed against the no intra-EU mobility  
and double intra-EU mobility scenarios. The no 
intra-EU mobility scenario is used to illustrate 
the impact of intra-EU mobility on sending and 
receiving countries. We hypothesise that,  
Map 4.1: Population change in EU-28 Member States between 1991 and 2015
Source: Eurostat, CEPAM - Created with mapchart.net© 
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in the long-term, thanks to greater convergence 
toward the living standards found in the most-
developed Member States, greater cohesion, 
diminishing regional disparities and stronger EU 
integration, it is likely that intra-EU mobility may 
slow down from the south and east of the EU  
to the west. Therefore, by 2060, it is likely that  
the impact of intra-EU mobility would be smaller 
than that projected under the central scenario, 
although still larger than in the no intra-EU mobility 
scenario. In contrast, the double intra-EU mobility 
scenario assumes that the deepening gap between 
the economically stronger and weaker Member 
States can lead to increased intra-EU mobility. 
 4.3  The impact of intra-EU mobility 
on the EU population
Intra-EU mobility has the biggest impact  
on the past and projected population change  
in the eastern Member States, where it exacerbates 
their population decline. The magnitude of this 
impact is illustrated in map 4.2 and figure 4.1, which 
depict relative changes in population size between 
2015 and 2060 according to the different scenarios. 
For example, the population of Romania would shrink 
from 19.9 million in 2015 to 13.8 million in 2060 in 
the central scenario (losing 30% of its population). 
However, the loss would be much lower in the no 
intra-EU mobility scenario, which is 14% of the 
2015 population (red bar in figure 4.1).
In the case of the double intra-EU mobility 
scenario, Romania could lose about 40% of its 
population by 2060 (orange bar in figure 4.1). Since 
most migrants are young adults, the direct effect 
of higher intra-EU emigration on the population 
change of a sending Member State is the loss  
of the mainly working-age population. The indirect 
effect is fewer new families because the number 
of the country’s potential parents is smaller than 
would be the case with less-intense emigration.
The relative adverse effect of intra-EU mobility 
is more pronounced in less populous countries. 
Despite large flows in absolute terms from,  
for example, Poland and Spain, figure 4.1 illustrates 
that the effect on their population size is actually 
less dramatic, although still sizeable.  
Of all the Member States showing a projected 
declining population, Slovenia is the only one where 
a no intra-EU mobility scenario would completely 
prevent a population decline (see figure 4.1).  
On the contrary, Germany, which is a net gainer 
from intra-EU mobility, would face a negative 
population change should intra-EU mobility stop. 
Due to its lower fertility rates and rapid change 
in age structure, Germany’s population would 
decline without arrivals from other Member 
States (intra-EU mobility) even with sustained 
high international migration. 
Among net receiving Member States21 , the impact  
of immigrants from other Member States  
is sizeable in Austria and the UK, although in most 
other Member States the changes in volume of the 
intra-EU flows do not make much difference to the 
population growth.
The outflow of people from the eastern and 
southern Member States contributes to an increase 
of population concentration in western Member 
States (countries depicted in red in map 4.2).  
In 2015, 54% of the EU’s 508 million lived in 
western Member States. Depending on the volume 
of intra-EU mobility in the future, and in case  
of sustained increases in international migration  
to/from the EU, this proportion would rise  
to 59-61% by 2060 according to the three 
scenarios. In absolute terms, the population  
of western Member States would increase by 30 
million in the no intra-EU mobility scenario (due 
to gains from international migration) and by 50 
million in the double intra-EU mobility scenario 
(due to larger gains from intra-EU mobility).  
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Map 4.2: Relative population change between 2015 and 2060 (projection) in EU Member States 
(a) Central scenario
Source: Eurostat, CEPAM - Created with mapchart.net©
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Population change 2015-2060
Central scenario
Map 4.2: Relative population change between 2015 and 2060 (projection) in EU Member States 
(b) No intra-EU mobility scenario 
Source: Eurostat, CEPAM - Created with mapchart.net©
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In contrast, only between 15-18% of EU residents 
would reside in the eastern Member States 
compared to 20% in 2015 (falling from 103 million 
to 82-93 million).
 4.4 Conclusions
Intra-EU mobility is driven to an important extent  
by demand for labour and wage inequality. In spite 
of strong economic growth in some eastern Member 
States (largely driven by foreign direct investment), 
convergence is relatively slow. For example, Slovenia 
– the most advanced country in the group in terms 
of economic performance – had a GDP per capita  
(in purchasing power standards) at only 76%  
of the EU-15 average in 2017, although up from 
67% in 2000 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2018). 
Although it likely benefited the EU as whole, 
unusually large emigration from the eastern 
Member States has had negative effects  
on the sending countries, contributing to lower 
economic growth and thus slower convergence 
to western EU Member States (IMF 2016). Gaps 
in wages and living standards keep driving 
the flow of labour westwards in spite of the 
implementation of EU cohesion policies, leading 
to a loss of home-grown talent and innovation 
as well as having consequences for inter-
generational replacement and population ageing 
(Atoyan et al. 2016). 
Policies targeting economic inequality between 
Member States resulting in greater cohesion 
and integration can help those countries facing 
population decline, a loss of working-age population 
and population ageing. But these policies also need 
to pay special attention to skills and try to reverse 
the education selectivity of emigration by offering 
interesting employment opportunities to the highly 
skilled and possibly facilitating return migration  
for some of the talent that has left.
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Figure 4.1: Relative population change (in %) between 2015 and 2060 (projection) in selected EU 
Member States, by scenario
Note: Countries are ranked by the relative importance of the impact of intra-EU mobility on their population (double intra-EU   
mobility scenario – no intra-EU mobility scenario) from positive to negative.
Source: Eurostat and CEPAM
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SUMMARY
The loss of talent to comparatively higher-income countries continuously confronts 
some societies within the EU, and many others around the globe. This section 
demonstrates at the EU level, what has already been seen in certain Member States 
in terms of high emigration. The purpose of this demographic exercise is to illustrate 
the relationship between high emigration and demographic variables, rather than 
presenting a scenario to be viewed as a likely future for the EU as a whole. It can also 
help demonstrate how the currently observed pattern of net migration inflows should 
not be automatically assumed to continue in the long term.
If the EU stagnated and started to see its highly educated citizens leave – on the scale 
already observed in some Southern and Eastern Member States – it would find itself 
with a smaller and less-educated workforce. Such changes would coincide with a more 
rapidly ageing population because emigrants tend to be early-career adults.
BOX 5: SCENARIOS FEATURED IN SECTION 5
High emigration scenario: This is a scenario which, due to a number of demographic factors – population 
ageing, shrinking labour force, as well as the attractiveness of other developed countries and emerging 
economies outside of the EU – creates more emigration than immigration. To assume some empirically 
based migration rates for this rather hypothetical scenario, we took those observed in Spain (emigration rate 
of 3.9% and immigration rate of 1.2% at the peak of the financial crisis in 2008) for the entire EU, aware that 
this was a rather specific situation. Same fertility rates as in the central scenario.
Central scenario: This is the same as in previous sections, assuming roughly constant fertility and flows 
of approximately 2 000 000 immigrants from third countries into the EU every year. Medium assumptions 
of mortality, education levels, includes intra-EU-mobility, and uses the recent average for migration.
Zero migration scenario: In this scenario there is no migration to/from EU and no intra-EU mobility. Same 
fertility rate as the central scenario.
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DEMOGRAPHIC 
CONSEQUENCES 
OF ‘BRAIN DRAIN’
 5.1  The hypothetical scenario of an EU 
‘brain drain’
Just a century ago, Europe lost a substantial share 
of its population as millions went in search of 
a better life overseas. Between 1850 and 1913, 
it is estimated that more than 40 million people 
emigrated from Europe to the New World (Hatton 
and Williamson 1994). Unlike what went before,  
the EU has seen far more immigrants than 
emigrants in recent decades and migration has 
become a driver of population growth. Yet, not only 
in the newer Members States but also in some 
older ones – particularly Spain, Portugal and Greece 
– emigration has exceeded immigration as many 
young adults left these countries during the most 
recent financial crisis.
What if the whole EU started facing brain 
drain or a large-scale emigration of skilled 
workers? 
To illustrate this hypothetical – but not impossible 
– situation, we developed a high emigration 
scenario (see descriptions of scenarios in box 5). 
The conditions of this scenario are that the EU 
cannot keep pace with economic, scientific and 
technological developments taking place in other 
parts of the developed world, particularly in East 
Asia and North America. Emerging economies also 
become attractive and create robust alternatives 
for potential immigrants.
As a consequence of this, immigrant flows 
into the EU would lessen considerably as other 
destinations become comparatively more attractive 
or advantageous. For similar reasons, many 
EU nationals would also decide to seek career 
opportunities in North America, East Asia and other 
more economically dynamic regions. This slow-
moving, long-term shift eventually returns Europe 
back to its historical patterns of more people 
emigrating than immigrating. 
The loss of talent 
to comparatively  
higher-income 
countries continuously 
confronts some 
societies within the 
EU, and many others 
around the globe.
 5.2  Consequences of the  
high-emigration scenario
Steep decline in the EU population
This high-emigration scenario leads to a net 
migration outflow of 9.4 million (nearly the 
population of Sweden) that would gradually lessen 
to 7.8 million for the period 2055-2060 (greater 
than Bulgaria’s population). Should this happen, 
at these levels, the EU would start to rapidly 
lose its population through a combination of 
high emigration and below replacement fertility. 
Therefore, as figure 5.1 demonstrates, the size 
of the EU population would decline by 31% from 
508.5 million in 2015 to 353 million people  
in 2060 (figure 5.1, blue line), i.e. 155 million  
less than in 2015. Such a rate  
of population decline might seem extreme, 
however, this is not unseen in the EU. Latvia 
and Lithuania have lost 27% and 23% of their 
populations, respectively, in a shorter period 
between 1990 and 2017, due in part to specific 
conditions of the post-Soviet era and the 
financial crisis years 2009-2012. By comparison, 
in the zero-migration scenario, the EU population 
would gradually reduce by 42 million people  
(8% of its population size) by 2060 (zero 
migration scenario, figure 5.1, orange line).
Figure 5.1: Population size of EU-28 in 2015-2060, by scenario
Source: CEPAM
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Severe population ageing
The high-emigration scenario would also lead  
to severe population ageing. Highest immigration 
rates are currently observed among young adults 
(peaking at 20-29 years old), who are more likely 
to immigrate as they are looking for better work 
and life opportunities and have a longer time span 
to benefit from the expected gains of migrating. 
Therefore, sizeable and lasting emigration from  
the EU would severely deplete the size of 
the working-age population. Under the high 
emigration scenario, the working-age population 
would shrink by half from 306 million in 2015  
to 150 million in 2060 (see figure 5.2) and its 
share of the total population would drop from 60% 
in 2015 to 43%. This is five percentage points lower 
than in the other scenarios (48%) respectively. 
Simultaneously, as older people are less likely  
to emigrate out of the EU, the share of the 
population aged 65+ would more than double from 
19% in 2015 to 41% in 2060. The zero migration 
and central scenarios lead to different overall 
population size (see figure 5.1) but a very similar 
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Figure 5.2: Size and share of the working-age (dark green) and 65+ population (light green)  
in EU-28 in 2015 and 2060, by scenario
Source: CEPAM
proportion of working age and population aged 65+ 
(figure 5.2). In the central scenario, the size  
of the working-age population would decrease 
by 17% by 2060 compared to its size in 2015, 
whereas in the zero-migration scenario the size 
would decrease by 27%.  
Loss of the more-educated workers 
As a consequence of the assumed ongoing 
educational expansion (as discussed in Section 
2), the share of the highly educated among the 
working-age population increases in all scenarios 
because retiring less-educated workers are 
replaced by their more-educated and younger 
counterparts. Thus, figure 5.3 shows the share 
of post-secondary educated increases in all 
scenarios. In the central scenario, the educational 
composition of the working-age population 
is affected by international migration, leading to 
a higher share of low educated (5% more than 
in the case of the zero-migration scenario) and 
a lower share of highly educated (4% less than  
in the case of the zero-migration scenario) in 2060. 
This is due to the fact that, on average, immigrants 
to the EU are less educated compared  
to the host population.
In the high-emigration scenario, we double  
the emigration rate of the highly educated 
compared to the rate in the central scenario. 
Highly educated workers thus have a much higher 
propensity to emigrate compared to the less-
educated population. Figure 5.3 shows that this 
scenario would lead to only 50% of the labour 
force having post-secondary education in the 
potential workforce, 10% less than would  
be the case in the zero-migration scenario. 
This scenario illustrates only one theoretically 
possible case of an EU that is in decline.  
An alternative pattern of migration may also  
be considered resulting from a loss of economic 
competitiveness with many highly skilled leaving 
Europe and, at the same time, large numbers  
of low-skilled migrants entering from Africa and 
Western Asia. This would result in less population 
decline and ageing, but an even stronger decline 
in the average skills of the European labour force.
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Figure 5.3:  Working-age population of EU-28 by educational attainment in 2015  
and in 2060, by scenario 
Source: CEPAM
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 5.3 Conclusions
To sum up, this high-emigration scenario can help 
illustrate at the EU level what some individual 
countries (certain southern and eastern EU Member 
States) have already experienced. The stagnant 
EU that is hypothesised in the high-emigration 
scenario would generate a rapidly decreasing and 
ageing population which would be less educated 
compared to the population projected under the 
central scenario. 
Such a scenario illustrates the detrimental effects 
that the high emigration of highly skilled workers 
can impose on a society. The lessons to be drawn 
about the loss of talent are also applicable to other 
regions of the world, in particular to developing 
countries which are often left with shortages in 
critical professions due to the prospect of higher 
pay from abroad. 
Within the EU, large emigration of talent can have 
a strong impact on the Member States and depress 
economic growth, necessitating compensation by 
increasing the productivity of the smaller workforce 
and tailoring education to be responsive to local 
job-market needs.
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PART B: 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
TRENDS AND 
MIGRATION IN 
AFRICA AND 
WESTERN ASIA 
In the same way that EU policies have global implications, the future  
of the EU will be influenced not just by internal dynamics but by developments 
around the world. To address this, the report now assesses the demographic 
outlook for regions of particular relevance to the EU due to factors  
of proximity or migration. A clearer demographic picture of regions outside  
the EU helps provide greater context and actionable solutions for policymakers 
in fields as different as development cooperation and diplomacy, natural 
resource management and migration policy, among others. 
The scenarios detailed in 'Part B' bring to light just how seriously diverging 
socio-economic development pathways can alter the course of world 
population growth. Specifically, the scenarios identify education as a key 
element in accelerating development.
Pressure coming from continuous population growth jeopardises the welfare  
and sustainability of many developing countries. This pressure interacts  
with other factors, such as conflict, instability and climate change, making  
it harder for people to maintain the ability and desire to build upon 
opportunities at home. These considerations and the resulting migration 
decisions have important implications for a third country’s accumulation  
of human capital and resilience.
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SUMMARY
Many regions of the world have progressed towards late stages of the demographic 
transition with both low rates of mortality and fertility, notably East Asia, North 
America and Europe. World population may even eventually peak and start to reduce 
slightly during the second half of the century, depending on how fast fertility levels 
in Africa drop to moderate levels.
This section underscores the urgent need for expanding education in Africa. Education 
expansion must keep pace with pressure coming from rapid population growth, as 
it holds the key to accelerating the demographic transition and bringing development 
successes within reach.
Achieving such goals depends on access to education for girls and young women 
in particular, as education and family planning are closely intertwined. Education 
broadens horizons and helps fertility enter the realm of conscious choice for women 
and men. Evidence from educational sub-populations within countries indicate that 
higher living standards and decisions for moderate fertility levels accompany higher 
education and the associated wider range of life choices.
BOX 6: SCENARIOS FEATURED IN SECTION 6
The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) are global development scenarios for the rest of the century that 
are widely used by the global environmental change research community. Instead of developing our own global 
scenarios, CEPAM decided to directly refer to the narratives and assumptions of a subset of these scenarios.
SSP1 (rapid social development): A sustainable and human well-being-focused path with an accelerated 
demographic transition and relatively low world population, as envisaged by the UN's Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals. Scenario assumes high education, low mortality, low fertility, and uses the long-term average 
of migration.
SSP2 (middle-of-the-road): Virtually identical to the CEPAM medium scenario. Trends continue and develop-
ment of low-income countries is uneven. Scenario assumes medium fertility, mortality, education, and uses 
the long-term average of migration.
SSP3 (stalled social development): A world separated into regions broadly characterised by rapidly growing 
populations. Scenario assumes low education, high mortality, high fertility, and uses the long-term average 
of migration.
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WORLD 
POPULATION 
GROWTH 
TRAJECTORIES
 6.1  The projected population growth  
of Africa 
The projections based on three scenarios – Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP)1, SSP2 and SSP3 
(explained in box 6) – are illustrated in figure 6.1, 
bringing to light the potential for large population 
growth in Africa. According to SSP1, the world 
population could be around 8.9 billion  
by 2060 and Africa as a whole could reach 2 billion, 
whereas under SSP3, global population could rise 
to 11 billion and Africa’s share could increase  
to 3.1 billion (figure 6.1a). It is clear, therefore, that 
whichever scenario is projected, Africa’s population 
is expected to increase more than that of the 
rest of the world. Africa is the EU’s neighbour and 
although it is currently acknowledged that most 
migration in Africa takes place intra-regionally 
(MEDAM, 2018), it cannot be discounted that 
immigration flows from Africa to Europe are likely 
to continue (European Commission 2018b), and 
due to a number of factors (rapid growth in youth 
population, increased education, increased wealth, 
climate change, conflict), more people might want 
and be able to come to the EU. It is therefore 
important to consider the projected population 
growth of Africa as it could be a source of possible 
future migration flows into the EU. 
These differences in population growth can  
be explained by those populations which  
are at various stages of the universal process 
of demographic transition. In this process, deaths 
(in particular child mortality) initially start to 
decline while births remain at high levels because 
high fertility norms tend to be embedded in most 
cultures. Hence, for a period, the combination  
of high-birth and low-death rates result in rapid 
population growth. It is only when birth rates also 
fall that population growth diminishes. African 
countries have entered this transition about 
The education of 
girls in Africa – 
whether rapidly 
expanded or stalled 
– will be decisive 
in determining the 
future of world 
population growth.
a century later than Europe and several decades 
later than Eastern Asia, which is why population 
growth is still very high in Africa and already low 
in Europe. Thus, the future of population growth in 
Africa will largely depend on the speed of fertility 
decline which is closely associated with female 
Figure 6.1a: Population projections for 2015-2060
(a) Projected world population (2015-2060) 
Source: CEPAM
Figure 6.1b: Population projections for 2015-2100
(b) Projected population of Africa (2015-2100) 
Source: CEPAM
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education and contraceptive use. Therefore, this 
section will look at how raising education levels in 
Africa, especially among girls, will affect birth rates 
and consequently population growth. 
 6.2  How female education leads to 
lower fertility rates
The series of Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS) provide high-quality data on fertility for 
most developing countries derived from large 
numbers of individual interviews that also collect 
key background characteristics for women. Of 
all the socio-economic variables measured, 
female education shows the strongest and most 
consistent relationship with fertility. Figure 6.2 
shows the differentials in fertility for six categories 
of educational attainment, collected from 58 
developing countries with multiple surveys from 
some countries. The dotted lines show the curves 
traced through the data for each education level 
and display an almost perfect ordering with 
uneducated women having the highest fertility 
rates and women with post-secondary education 
having the lowest. 
There are also good reasons to believe that the 
effect of education on fertility is in fact causal 
because first, it brings fertility within the calculus  
of conscious choice (as suggested by A. Coale 1975); 
secondly, more-educated women tend to want 
fewer children; and thirdly, better-educated women 
are more empowered to access contraception 
and actually have fewer children despite possible 
resistance from husbands or family.22 
Figure 6.1c: Population projections for 2015-2060
Projected population growth by region (2015-2060)
Source: CEPAM
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Figure 6.2: Total fertility rates (TFR) for six different levels of female education  
for multiple DHS surveys from 58 developing countries (most recent survey data for each country, with the x-axis giving  
the average fertility level and the coloured dots indicating education-specific levels in that country)
Source: CEPAM
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 6.3  How the expansion of girls' 
education determines the future 
population growth in Africa  
Until the 1970s, fertility in sub-Saharan Africa 
remained very high with an average TFR of 
around seven births per woman (Bongaarts and 
Casterline 2013), and differences between regions 
and countries were relatively modest. Over the 
past quarter century, however, significant fertility 
declines have occurred, particularly in Eastern and 
Southern Africa, while fertility remains at pre-
demographic transition levels in some countries in 
Western and Central Africa. 
As a result, differences among African countries 
have grown large over time. In 2015, the TFR in 
the African region ranged from 6.8 births per 
woman in Niger to 1.5 in Mauritius.23 Except 
for a few countries in Southern Africa, current 
fertility rates in sub-Saharan Africa are among 
the highest in the world, making it much harder to 
reach development goals.
African countries are latecomers in the process 
of demographic transition compared to Asia 
or Latin America24, and some could remain 
trapped in low-education and high-fertility rates 
longer than others. As argued by Bongaarts 
and Casterline (2013), high fertility levels in 
Africa are also a consequence of parents having 
higher desired family size and thus having less 
motivation to adopt birth control.25 In this context, 
there is a controversial discussion about African 
exceptionalism26 to be explained by cultural 
factors which also manifests itself via objections 
from husbands or other family members about 
contraception and concerns about the moral 
and social acceptability of family planning. 
Whatever the specific cultural embeddedness of 
reproductive decisions, as mentioned above, the 
empowerment of women through education can 
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strongly contribute to overcoming such resistance 
and enable them to effectively pursue their own 
interests, which tends to result in lower fertility.
To see the effect educational attainment can have 
on fertility rates, we will now look at the scenarios. 
Figure 6.1 shows that if there was little further 
progress in education, the associated higher 
fertility rates in African countries would generate 
a world population size 15%27 larger (for the SSP3 
scenario) than under the SSP2 scenario, whilst  
the rapid expansion of education associated with  
a more rapid fertility decline (SSP1) would generate 
a population 10%28 lower than that in the SSP2 
scenario. Although differences in population  
projections reflect assumptions about all 
demographic components, these differences  
in future of population growth are to a large extent 
due to different future education trajectories. 
The population pyramids (in figure 6.3) display  
the distribution by age, sex and level of education 
of the African population in 2060, under the rapid 
development scenario (SSP1), the medium (SSP2) 
and the stalled development scenario (SSP3), 
illustrating the potential impact of investments  
in social development, in particular female 
education, on future population dynamics.29  
As shown by the SSP3 population pyramid, Africa 
is in danger of becoming less educated over time 
if education expansion cannot keep pace with 
population growth. 
    For
development
to succeed,  
the expansion  
of education  
must keep pace  
with rapid 
population
growth
Figure 6.3: Scenario SSP1 - Rapid Development Scenario - Age and education pyramids for Africa in 2060, 
according to three contrasting scenarios; the colours indicate the level of educational attainment
Source: CEPAM
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Figure 6.3: Scenario SSP2 - Central Scenario - Age and education pyramids for Africa in 2060, according to three 
contrasting scenarios; the colours indicate the level of educational attainment 
Source: CEPAM
Figure 6.3: Scenario SSP3 - Stalled Development Scenario - Age and education pyramids for Africa in 2060, 
according to three contrasting scenarios; the colours indicate the level of educational attainment
Source: CEPAM
 6.4 Conclusions
This section looked at Africa's future population 
growth under three global development scenarios 
following the SSP narratives. It discussed how 
female education can help reduce fertility rates 
and illustrated how alternative education and 
social development scenarios affect population 
growth as well as the make-up of a population’s 
future age and educational attainment. While 
population policies tend to be a controversial 
topic, a clear policy focus on female education  
is much less controversial. 
In terms of the consequences of population growth, 
there can be little doubt that rapid population 
growth makes it much more difficult to expand 
essential services such as education and health, 
which in turn are essential for social and economic 
development. Improvements in reproductive 
health and female education also work together 
synergistically in reducing the desired family 
size and making it easier to access effective 
contraception, resulting in lower fertility. 
Looking at the scenarios, it becomes apparent that 
a policy focus on education has the double effect 
of simultaneously reducing fertility and increasing 
skills and thus economic productivity. This could 
create a virtuous circle of women’s empowerment, 
better health, lower fertility and economic growth, 
putting human capital investment at the centre  
of global development strategies.
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SUMMARY
Africa’s population will increase by a factor of two to three, or possibly even more over 
the coming decades in the event of stalled socio-economic development. In addition, 
population growth in Western Asia will also be significant. For example, the population 
of Afghanistan is likely to triple and that of Pakistan to almost double. Such massive 
projected population increases raise questions about future job opportunities, economic 
growth, as well as the peace and stability necessary to facilitate such opportunities. 
Furthermore, the already unavoidable climate change is likely to further complicate 
these challenges. 
The insecurity and conflict arising from worsening economic and environmental 
conditions act as key push factors for potential migrants. These factors are associated 
with a perceived lack of opportunity to thrive in one’s own country, reflected in youth 
unemployment and a lack of suitable jobs. Pursuing policies that enhance local 
employment opportunities and foster stability and security are critical to building 
opportunities in the countries of origin.
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REASONS 
FOR MIGRATION 
IN AFRICA AND 
WESTERN ASIA
 7.1 Conflict and instability  
 as push-factors  
This section looks at the factors confronting Africa 
and Western Asia, which are critical in creating 
possible push factors for outmigration: conflict, 
unemployment and instability. Such political and 
economic factors are much more volatile and 
harder to forecast than the demographic and 
human capital trends discussed in the previous 
section which are backed by greater inertia 
and predictability. Thus, this section focuses on 
recent developments and current socio-economic 
conditions in Africa and Western Asia that may give 
rise to future migration. It is beyond the scope of 
CEPAM’s research to be able to make projections on 
alternative unemployment rates, conflict scenarios 
or other political developments over the coming 
decades that may cause future migration flows to 
the EU1. Climate change, however, is another more 
slowly evolving and more predictable change, which 
will be explicitly discussed in Section 8. Here we will 
only consider it as a possible trigger of conflict.
Conflicts can cause multiple negative consequences 
for human well-being, which can be important 
reasons for people deciding to leave their home 
country. These consequences range from possible 
premature death and injury to psychological 
trauma, destruction of housing and loss of 
livelihoods. There is abundant evidence that such 
experiences or fear of such experiences can be 
a major push factor for outmigration. 
In parts of Western Asia and Africa recent escalation 
in conflicts, terrorist attacks and increasing forms 
of organised violence have forced people to move 
both within their countries and abroad in search of 
security and peace. The intensity of the conflict and 
the location of the fighting can explain an essential 
part of the variation in flows of asylum applications 
and refugees, both inside and outside the EU. 
Insecurity, conflict 
and population 
growth interplay 
to degrade life 
prospects, pushing 
migrants away 
from building 
a future locally.
Results suggest that people flee terror and war,  
as well as violence and insecurity emerging from 
non-conflict-affected areas and areas perpetrated 
by different criminal groups (Conte and Migali 2018). 
Figure 7.1 presents a recent estimate of global flows 
of asylum seekers by world regions for the five-year 
periods 2006-2010 and 2011-2015 (Abel 2018).  
The arrows indicate the direction of flows, while  
the thickness of the arrows shows the volume  
of flows. Indeed, this comprehensive estimate 
of global bilateral flows confirms the view that 
Western Asia and Africa have been the most 
important regions of origin for refugees while 
Western Europe is the most important destination 
region. Interestingly, the pattern changes somewhat 
between the two periods: in 2011-2015, refugee 
movements from Eastern to Southern Africa 
dominate the picture and are much larger than 
the combined flows from all African regions  
to Western Europe. The regional definitions used  
in this analysis do not directly allow for identifying 
the flows into the EU, which mainly comprise 
Western and Northern Europe (only receiving 
countries of refugees), as well as parts of Eastern 
and Southern Europe (both receiving and sending 
countries). 
This recent study (Abel et al. 2018) conducted  
in the context of CEPAM also tried to link conflict-
induced migration to several triggering factors, 
including spells of drought caused by climate 
change. Climate contributed to the outbreak of 
conflicts in Western Asia from 2010-2012, where 
political uprising occurred in countries including 
Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, and Syria. In Syria, 
particularly, long-running droughts and water 
shortages caused by climate change resulted  
in repeated crop failures, with rural families 
eventually moving to urban areas. This in turn led  
to overcrowding, unemployment and political unrest, 
and then civil war. Similar patterns were also found 
in sub-Saharan Africa during the same period. 
However, it is hard to draw generalisations from this 
trend because the findings of this study suggest that 
the impact of climate on conflict and consequently 
on asylum-seeking flows is limited to specific time 
periods and contexts.
Figure 7.1: Asylum seeking flows by world region, 2006-2010 (left) and 2011-2015 (right) 
Source: Abel 2018
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 7.2  Youth unemployment as a driver 
of outmigration
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is currently the youngest 
region in the world and has the largest potential 
increase in domestic labour supply. Under the SSP2 
scenario (Lutz et al. 2018), in SSA, the share of the 
working-age population is projected to increase 
over the coming decades in all subregions, with the 
percentage change ranging from 4.7% in Southern 
Africa to 31% in Central Africa between 2015 
and 2060. Educational attainment in SSA is also 
expected to increase over time in all subregions, 
although it would still remain lower than 
educational attainment in the rest of the world. For 
the North Africa sub-region, by 2060, 77% of the 
population would have a post-secondary or higher 
education and those with no formal education 
would be less than 5%. For the Middle East, 64% 
of the population would have a post-secondary 
education or higher, against 6% with no formal 
education (Lutz et al. 2018).  
In recent years, most countries in the SSA region 
have experienced high and sustained economic 
growth, although starting from a very low level. Six 
of the ten fastest-growing economies in the world 
are from this region (Samans and Zahidi 2017) and, 
according to the World Bank’s latest estimates, GDP 
growth is expected to strengthen to 3.1% in 2018 
and 3.5% in 2019 (World Bank 2018a). 
When studying the relationship between economic 
growth and outmigration, however, it is important 
to note that it is not linear. Under extremely poor 
conditions, people cannot afford to move to another 
country. Although South Sudan is currently one of 
the poorest countries with the most insecure living 
conditions, hardly any migrants from South Sudan 
make it to Europe. They simply cannot afford the 
cost of travel which may include excessive fees 
for traffickers. 
More generally, there is a well-established pattern 
whereby, in the early phases of development 
and economic growth, outmigration rates tend 
to increase as some people get the means 
and a desire to actually leave the country. As 
development continues, however, outmigration 
rates typically fall again, unless conflict and huge 
unemployment bring additional hardship. It thus 
seems to be to less the objective difference in 
wages between countries of origin and destination 
that drives migration, rather the perceived 
opportunities for a better future in one’s own 
country. If these opportunities for the future look 
very bleak, it can be a reason to leave; if they 
obviously look better than the current conditions 
and people see a brighter future for themselves 
and their families, they may choose to stay.  
Despite the good news about economic growth in 
many SSA countries, the labour market is generally 
characterised as being largely informal31. Work 
    When 
deciding whether 
to migrate, 
the objective 
differences  
in wages between 
countries are less 
influential than 
the outlook on 
opportunities  
at home
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remains widespread in the informal sector, as 
major supply-and-demand challenges hamper the 
creation of formal jobs. On the labour supply side, 
inadequate supply of human capital32 is perceived 
as a major obstacle to business expansion by 
51% of firms in SSA, surveyed by the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey (World Bank 2018b). 
While employment in the formal sector has 
increased in recent decades (especially in small 
enterprises), this increase has not kept pace 
with the population growth, leading to a growing 
mismatch between supply and demand. The 
growing number of young people entering the 
labour force every year, combined with the limited 
transformation of most economies into high-
productivity and non-agricultural jobs, could also 
consolidate the informal sector as the main source 
of jobs for young people, especially the least skilled 
and least educated, in the near future.
Figure 7.2 shows the recent trend in youth 
unemployment for selected countries and regions 
in Africa and Western Asia. Actually, North Africa 
has among the highest youth unemployment in 
the world with over 30% in Tunisia and Egypt 
in 2017. With continued population growth, the 
serious challenge of massive youth unemployment 
could further increase in the future. Figure 7.2 
also shows that for the youth unemployment 
rate SSA seems to fare better than North Africa 
and Western Asia. However, this is also linked to 
the way unemployment data are collected and 
estimated. Low unemployment rates in SSA can 
mask high poverty, and countries with higher levels 
of economic development also tend to register 
higher unemployment rates, as observed in South 
Africa for example. 
Unemployment also relates to the size of different 
age groups in relation to others. There is a huge 
body of literature on the so-called ‘youth bulge’33 
in Africa and Western Asia which refers to social 
and political risks resulting from large numbers 
of young adults with high aspirations, but low 
economic opportunities and little possibility for 
Figure 7.2: Youth unemployment (% of total labour force aged 15-24)
Source: World Bank 2018
Data from database: World Development Indicators
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political participation. There seems to be some 
evidence that an increasing proportion of idle and 
unemployed young people in the developing world 
serves as a catalyst for internal conflict which 
in turn can also be a push factor for migration 
(Cincotta 2011).
 7.3 Conclusions
Conflict, instability and a perceived lack of future 
opportunities in the country of origin have been 
shown to be key push factors when it comes 
to the decision to leave a country either as a 
refugee or as an economic migrant. But these 
economic and political factors are very volatile 
and almost impossible to forecast with any 
meaningful probability. In contrast, much more inert 
demographic processes, including human capital 
formation, can be anticipated with a longer time 
horizon. This also applies to climate change which 
has been identified as a possible trigger of conflict 
and forced migration under certain conditions. For 
these reasons, we have tried to focus on some of 
the slowly changing factors that can be identified as 
underlying drivers of possible future push factors.
What policy priorities can be drawn from this an 
analysis? The European Commission has recently 
adopted measures in an effort to boost economic 
growth and human capital. The ‘new Africa-
Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and 
Jobs’ aims to increase investment in Africa, create 
jobs and invest in education and skills, at both 
the continental and national levels, to strengthen 
employability and respond to labour market needs. 
The ‘European Union Emergency Trust Fund for 
stability and addressing root causes of irregular 
migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for 
Africa)’ aims to promote stability and contribute to 
better management of migration. 
Policy priorities in this area should also focus on 
understanding the obstacles to the development 
of young people’s skills, expanding school 
enrolment, while ensuring the quality and 
relevance of higher education to specific local 
labour market needs. Job creation in the formal 
sector will be crucial to absorb the growing 
number of young people entering the workforce 
each year. Policies that stimulate economic 
growth and utilise local talent are necessary for 
development. Efforts in the field of education and 
the labour market should be combined with the 
promotion of an environment that allows for an 
effective and productive use of knowledge in the 
economy. Political instability, corruption, violence 
and conflict are strong factors limiting economic 
growth and productivity. For policymakers, 
promoting the prevention and reduction of conflict 
and violence, addressing human rights violations, 
and enforcing the rule of law will be key actions to 
reduce migratory pressure.
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SUMMARY
The potential of global climate change and natural disasters as future drivers 
of migration has attracted significant media attention. To capture the latest scientific 
understanding of whether climate change will result in mass-migration events, we 
conducted a comprehensive literature review. In the previous section, we identified 
climate change as one of the possible triggers of conflict which, in turn, would induce 
migration. Here we study the relationship between climate change and migration 
more broadly.
While evidence of direct climate-related migration is inconclusive, climate change can 
influence migration by affecting drivers of migration such as political and economic 
conditions. When climate-change-related migration does occur, we find that it tends 
to be mostly intra-regional. For example, intra-regional migration within Africa makes 
up by far the largest share of international migration globally.
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EVIDENCE FOR 
CLIMATE-RELATED 
MIGRATION
 8.1  The relationship between 
environmental change and migration 
The view that climate change would result in mass 
migration across borders has been referred to as an 
‘alarmist’ approach, based on a simple assumption 
that all affected populations in environmental risk 
areas would eventually move out (Gemenne 2011). 
Whilst empirical studies on climate change and 
disaster and migration have become increasingly 
prolific, especially since 2010 (Borderon et al. 2018; 
Piguet, Kaenzig and Guélat 2018), thanks to the 
availability of environmental and migration data  
and tools (Fussell, Hunter and Gray 2014), the 
evidence on the relationship between environmental 
change and migration is inconclusive. 
Indeed, a body of research on the issue shows that 
on the one hand, climate variability or climatic 
shocks can drive migration (with migration normally 
being employed as a coping strategy), whilst on 
the other hand, such variability and shocks can 
suppress migration due to the lack of resources 
to facilitate it. A review of the effect of climate 
variability and migration based on 20 macro-level 
studies shows that there is no conclusive evidence 
on the direction and magnitude of the influence 
of environmental change on migration, which can 
range from a limited and rather indirect role (de 
Haas 2011) to significant impacts (Marchiori and 
Schumacher 2011; Missirian and Schlenker 2017).
This lack of consensus is partly due to the 
complexity of migration processes and their 
interactions with different drivers. It is likely that 
climate change indirectly influences migration by 
inducing changes in other drivers of migration, 
such as a reduction in crop yields (Cai et al. 2016), 
changes in GDP per capita (Cattaneo and Peri 2016; 
Coniglio and Pesce 2015) and being a trigger of 
conflict (Abel et al. 2019). Indeed, a systematic 
review of 53 studies on environmental change  
Climate-related 
migration primarily 
involves a short-
distance move within 
a country or region, 
rather than over long 
distances.
and migration focusing on Africa by Borderon et al. 
(2018) reports that there is no evidence showing 
that environmental change is the sole driver  
of migration. 
Some experts claim that climate change, crop 
failure and food security are responsible for  
the recent migrant caravans moving towards  
the United States from Central American countries, 
including Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador 
(Milman, Holden and Agren 2018). Likewise, the 
Syrian crisis and massive refugee flows from Syria 
in the past couple of years have been highlighted 
as a consequence of conflict driven by growing 
water scarcity, frequent droughts and poor water 
governance (Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. 2015). 
The indirect impact of climate change on migration 
is captured in a recent study by Abel et al. (2019) 
which shows that droughts increase the flow  
of asylum seekers, as a consequence of droughts 
increasing the risk of conflict. Figure 8.1 presents 
how changes in the Standardised Precipitation-
Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI)34 results in different 
conflict intensity. The positive value of SPEI 
indicates wet conditions where the negative values 
indicates drought.
Here we find that a one (within-country) standard 
deviation decrease in the SPEI leads on average to 
an increase of approximately 0.03 in the probability 
of asylum-seeking flows from the country 
experiencing a change in this climatic factor. Such 
a link between changes in drought severity and 
asylum-seeking flows is mediated by the increase 
in the likelihood of conflict caused by the change  
in the climatic variable, which can be very large  
in some world regions, as shown in figure 8.1. 
    It is likely 
that climate change 
indirectly affects 
migration  
by influencing  
other migration 
drivers
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Map 8.1: Marginal effects of SPEI on conflict for the 2010-2012 period
Source: Abel et al. 2019
Conflict
Total marginal effect of SPEI on conflict
Computed on country-level based upon estimations for 2010-2012
The average value of the SPEI is 0, and the standard deviation is 1.
The SPEI is a standardised variable, and it can therefore be compared with other SPEI values over time and space.
The lower SPEI-index values are associated with more severe droughts.
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Taking into account the findings from extensive 
studies mentioned above, establishing a clear 
relationship between climate change and migration 
is not simple – rather, the indirect impacts  
of climate change on decisions to migrate need 
more careful research. Whilst the media and public 
concern often focuses on the impacts of climate 
change on international migration, the research 
suggests the opposite. Climate-related migration  
is likely to involve a short-distance move within  
a country rather than a long-distance move across 
borders (Borderon et al. 2018; Rigaud et al. 2018; 
Sterly, Sakdapolrak and Ober 2016). 
 8.2. Conclusions
This section has shown that caution must be 
expressed in matters regarding climate-related 
migration since current research cannot yet 
establish a clear, causal link between climate 
change and migration. However, research suggests 
that when there is climate-related migration,  
it tends to be over a short distance. If climate 
change becomes more severe or human mobility 
increases further, these patterns, including  
the indirect effects of migration, could change  
in the future.
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REPORT SUMMARY 
AND CONCLUSIONS
While exploring a spectrum of demographic 
scenarios for the future of the EU and the wider 
world, CEPAM found evidence that dispels some 
popular and important misconceptions about 
migration and the nature of demographic change. 
The different migration scenarios considered in this 
report reveal that when considering how migration 
can impact the labour force dependency ratio, 
economic integration is more influential than either 
education selection or migration volume. While 
a high volume of migration does increase the overall 
working-age population, it also increases the overall 
non-working population, having limited ability to 
impact the dependency ratio in the long term.
Thinking of the EU, it is all but certain that 
population ageing will continue. This ageing, 
a product of longer life spans, is a sign of success 
in health and living standards. Insights gained 
from the demographic scenarios show that for the 
challenges of population ageing the most effective 
strategy is to increase labour-force participation of 
everyone, particularly women. Both higher fertility 
and more migration, in a variety of scenarios, are 
shown to have minimal impact by comparison. As 
significant real-world costs – such as funding, time 
and effort – are on the line, this is one example 
of how essential it is that the origins of policy are 
based on evidence.
Faced with the expected demographic ageing as 
well as a transforming labour market, the future 
populations of EU Member States will have to 
become more adaptable. Fortunately, the average 
educational attainment is continuing to rise. Such 
investments in education and human capital will 
be the best defence against uncertainty. For the 
EU, it is also important to recognise that internal 
mobility encouraged by economic disparities 
has the potential to disproportionately influence 
the emigration of skilled people and even the 
overall population sizes of certain Member States, 
primarily in Eastern and Southern Europe.
In a similar sense, different socio-economic 
development trajectories will have a huge impact 
on the world. This is particularly true for Africa 
and Western Asia where the difference between 
stalled and rapid development will impact the 
lives of billions. If education among girls in Africa 
becomes widespread, for example, the continent 
could access a virtuous, reinforcing cycle of lower 
mortality, lower fertility and higher socio-economic 
development. However, a situation of stalled 
education expansion and development produces 
the opposite, leading to a world of rapid population 
growth, instability and increased conflict. Such 
conflict and instability are important reasons for 
outmigration. Furthermore, climate change can 
encourage intra-regional migration and may be an 
indirect factor for other drivers of migration. Linking 
education with local job market opportunities and 
ensuring an ability to thrive in one's own country 
are critical in lessening push factors and the 
pressure for migration.
Above all else, this report aims to inject 
a scientifically faithful understanding of 
demography into policy initiatives. By taking 
these key findings to heart, relevant policy 
initiatives for the future will be better positioned 
to forge sustainable solutions to the demographic 
challenges of our times.
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Reliable data and state-of-the-art analysis are key 
prerequisites for evidence-based policymaking, 
especially in the field of migration, where myths 
and ideologies often compete with evidence-based 
reasoning. While reliable data exist for other 
demographic components, there is still plenty of 
room for improvement to the state of migration 
flow data in the EU and third countries, which is an 
opinion echoed by researchers and policymakers 
alike.35 There is also a need for more EU-level 
capability for comprehensive demographic analysis 
(by age, education and labour-force status) of likely 
future population trends in and around Europe, with 
a specific focus on Africa and Western Asia.  
Benefits of the multidimensional 
demographic approach 
In terms of analytical tools applied, the study 
of migration and its longer-term implications 
calls for more comprehensive multi-dimensional 
demographic micro- and macro-simulations, 
which go beyond conventional models defined in 
terms of age and sex structures only. This can 
be done by explicitly incorporating population 
heterogeneity due to level of education, place 
of residence, labour force participation, country 
of birth, duration of stay in country and others. 
The CEPAM study tried to move the frontier of 
research into this direction. 
There are many advantages of a multidimensional 
demographic approach, which complements 
conventional analysis by age and sex with 
a stratification, for example, by level of education 
and labour-force participation. In the Commission’s 
Ageing Report (European Commission 2018a), 
for instance, a set of alternative scenarios are 
analysed in terms of their effects on population 
structure by age and sex, and matched with 
economic assumptions on future labour-force 
participation and employment plus additional 
exogenous productivity assumptions. Building on 
this important step, an integrated model would be 
able to move further and fill in key gaps, generating 
the supply of labour comprehensively by age, 
gender and level of skills in a multidimensional 
form. The key advantage to using this approach lies 
in its ability to make projections on education and 
labour-force participation as well as age and sex, 
and incorporating their interdependencies. Fertility 
and mortality systematically vary according to 
education, and so does labour-force participation. 
Human capital scenarios are also interesting in 
their own right since progress in education, as 
projected in the scenarios in this report, is a key 
component of human development and socio-
economic progress more generally. Research has 
shown that economic growth is fastest when 
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better-educated younger people enter the labour 
force (Lutz, Crespo Cuaresma and Sanderson 
2008), and this multidimensional demographic 
approach is able to project the future educational 
attainment of both younger populations and that of 
older-age groups, which is very significant for their 
health and disability. 
Towards consistent data on migration flows 
in the EU and beyond 
To document the dynamics of internal EU migration, 
Member States are obliged to provide harmonised 
migration flow statistics to Eurostat (Regulation 
(EC) No 862/2007). Despite these efforts, obtaining 
the necessary data on intra-EU mobility remains 
a challenge. This is due in part to the complexities 
in capturing the phenomenon when EU citizen 
have the right to free movement, and in part to 
the limited number of variables mandated in the 
regulation. Beyond those variables, Member States 
provide data to Eurostat only on a voluntary basis, 
which results in discrepancies36 and missing data 
for certain countries and years. Furthermore, 
important characteristics of immigrants, such as 
their level of education, are frequently unavailable 
for all EU countries. 
Beyond the EU, similar limitations exist. Many 
countries do not produce or publish migration-
related data: for example, only 45 of the 193 UN 
member states report statistics on migration flows 
(IOM and McKinsey & Company 2018); data is 
spread incoherently across various locations and 
sources both at national and international levels; 
and the inconsistency in definitions, sources and 
measurements all contribute to making it difficult 
to compare data. For instance, of the 45 countries 
that report migration-flow data, only 24 use the 
same definition as to what constitutes a migrant 
(IOM and McKinsey & Company 2018). For CEPAM, 
we relied on the estimates of global bilateral 
migration flows provided by Abel (2018). However, 
due to the many assumptions and uncertainties 
involved, such statistical estimations are no 
substitute for actual empirical data.
To address some of the limitations of the current 
EU data, the European Commission is already 
working on new statistical regulations. According 
to the Eurostat’s European Statistics Code of 
Practice, official statistics should be characterised 
by quality standards, concerning definitions, 
classifications, data-collection methodologies, 
etc. Such harmonisation of data collection 
should take place at an early stage. However, 
the harmonisation process at the EU level is 
implemented at later stages, which means that 
data-collection methods and definitions differ. 
New EU regulations, or amendments to existing 
regulations, will improve the quantity and quality 
of the data collected by Member States and 
provided to the European Commission (Eurostat). 
The improvements will take the form of, for 
example, finer disaggregation levels in some 
of the variables, a new and richer combination 
of variables in tables, or the more frequent 
transmission of some of the tables to Eurostat. 
The European Commission is also working on a 
new regulation on population statistics which 
will combine existing annual demographic 
and migration statistics with new annual 
statistics covering some census-type socio-
economic information. This effort will enable 
a better understanding of the EU population’s 
demographic and social developments. Another 
development that is gradually improving the 
quality of migration and population statistics is 
the exploitation of existing administrative data, 
i.e. data collected by government departments 
for various other administrative procedures. An 
example of such data is population registers. 
Meeting the data-collection requirements of the 
new regulations mentioned above, for instance, 
relies on a greater use of administrative data. 
These plans must materialise if there is to be 
sustainable, reliable demographic analysis in the 
EU. Moreover, limitations on the data available 
globally will also need to be addressed.
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Strengthening capabilities for demographic 
research 
Many existing networks of national institutes or 
researchers within the EU deal with demographic 
questions. The European Commission engages in 
such issues through its employment, migration, 
scientific and research agendas37,38,39 as well as 
through its statistical office, Eurostat.40 Population 
Europe41 is an active network of national 
researchers and demography institutes across 
the EU. The focus of such networks is largely on 
the European population rather than on Europe’s 
neighbourhood. Research on Western Asia and 
Africa in particular is still dominated by institutions 
based in the US or the United Nations. Despite the 
geographical proximity of Africa and Western Asia, 
Eurostat’s mandate is currently limited to studying 
population trends within the EU.  
Since there appears to be a gap in comprehensive 
demographic analysis and the resulting knowledge 
of the European neighbourhood, there is room  
for more work at the EU level to bring together 
existing knowledge and to expand into the study  
of populations outside Europe. Strengthening 
the EU’s own research capacity on the massive 
demographic changes happening in its immediate 
neighbourhood would enable more anticipatory 
analysis. Producing multidimensional population 
scenarios in the context of sustainable 
development, with a focus on Africa and Western 
Asia as well as Eastern Europe, would also be 
relevant for longer-term policy planning in the EU.
It is therefore essential to maintain and 
strengthen comprehensive demographic research 
on future population dynamics in the EU and 
beyond in a multidimensional way. Such efforts 
will form the basis for how we look at the current 
historically significant demographic change, which 
is one of this century’s megatrends.
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Age structure: the distribution of the population 
by age.
Demographic transition: The transition from high-
fertility and mortality rates to low ones; during 
transition, the population grows, while at the end 
of the transition, the population is stable or even 
declining and the age structure is older.
Educational attainment: This is the highest level 
of formal education an individual has completed. 
In this report, it is organised into six categories 
based on the International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED) 2011 classification: no 
education; incomplete primary; primary; lower 
secondary; upper secondary; and post-secondary. 
For EU Member States, the last category is further 
subdivided into short post-secondary, bachelor's 
and master’s or higher.
Educational composition: This refers to the 
distribution of population by levels of education.
Human capital: The knowledge, skills, 
competencies and attributes individuals have 
that facilitate the creation of personal, social and 
economic well-being. Educational attainment is 
used as a proxy for human capital in this report.
Intra-EU mobility: This concerns the action of 
people (EU nationals or legally resident third-
country nationals) undertaking their right to free 
movement by moving from one EU Member State 
to another.
Labour-force dependency ratio (LFDR): The ratio 
between people not in the labour force and in the 
labour force. 
Labour-force participation rate (LFPR): The 
proportion of a country’s working-age population 
which engages actively in the labour market, either 
by working or looking for work.
Old-age dependency ratio: The ratio between the 
population aged 65 years old and over (65+) and 
the working-age population (20-64 years old).
Population ageing: The age structure of 
a population getting older is typically measured in 
terms of the increasing median age or the growing 
proportion of those aged 65+ in the population.
Replacement level: The level of fertility at which, 
in the absence of migration and with a stable 
age structure and no changes in mortality, the 
population exactly replaces itself, i.e. neither grows 
nor declines. In low-mortality populations, this 
corresponds to about TFR 2.05. 
Total age dependency ratio: This is the ratio 
between the number of dependants (children age 
0-19 and those aged 65+) and the working-age 
population (20-64 years old). It indicates how 
many dependants the working-age population has 
to support.
Total fertility rate (TFR): This refers to the average 
number of children born to a woman by the time 
she reached the end of her child-bearing years, 
if she were to pass through all her child-bearing 
years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates 
of a given year.  
Working-age population: The population typically 
defined as those aged 20 to 64, which is often 
considered as the potential labour force.
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81 Glossary
 1   For more information:  
 https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/projects-activities/cepam-centre-expertise-population-migration_en
 2   The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) are global development scenarios for the rest of the century that 
are widely used by the global environmental change research community. Rather than developing new global 
scenarios, CEPAM refers to the narratives and assumptions of a subset of these scenarios (see Section 6).
 3   See in particular Migali, Natale, Tintori, et al. (2018). For more information: 
https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/migration-demography_en
 4   Total fertility rate (TFR) in the EU-28 has oscillated over the last 20 years between 1.45 and 1.6 children per woman. 
In most Member States, the TFR has increased in the past years mainly due to motherhood being postponed  
to a later age. This trend is expected to prevail in the medium-term, with slightly increasing fertility. Thereafter,  
we assume a stable TFR for the projection horizon. 
 5   This increase is comparable to that in Eurostat’s 2015-based population projections, which expects an EU 
population of around 524 million people in 2060. 
 6  Replacement level in the EU is around 2.05 children per woman. In 2015, only France (1.96) had a TFR close  
to this level.
 7   Section 3 discusses the impact of the volume of immigration and the level of immigrants’ integration into  
the labour force on the size of the EU’s labour force. 
 8  The discussion on Eastern Member States losing their labour force to more affluent Western Member States  
is in Section 5.  
 9  These scenarios are based on different qualitative narratives and all use medium assumptions on fertility, 
mortality, education, and EU-mobility – see pages 32-35.  
 10  Post-secondary is defined as higher than completed upper-secondary education, i.e. having a higher diploma  
or university degree (bachelor, master’s or higher). 
 11  https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/notices/supplementary-immigration-levels-2019.
html, consulted 24-01-2019. 
 12  http://www.cic.gc.ca/opendata-donneesouvertes/data/Facts_and_Figures_2016_PR_EN.pdf, consulted 20-11-2018 
 13  Combining the TFWP and the IMP programmes: http://www.cic.gc.ca/opendata-donneesouvertes/data/Facts_and_
Figures_2016_TR_EN.pdf, consulted 24-01-2019 
 14   For simplicity, we refer to the following broad regional country groupings: Southern: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Cyprus and Malta. Western: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg,  
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Eastern: Bulgaria, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
 15  EU-15 refers to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,  
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
 16  Neither Eurostat population projections nor our previous exercise (Lutz et al. 2018) differentiate between  
the two types of migration flows. 
 17  See ’The way forward for demographic analysis’ section for the discussion on data gaps in demography. 
 18  The estimation of bilateral flows among EU Member States is still a work in progress. According to the method, 
after estimating the bilateral flows matrix, country-specific calibration factors are calculated from a preliminary 
simulation for the period 2013-2016 in order to get the same number of entrances by country as that estimated 
by Eurostat for the same period. These calibration factors are kept constant for the rest of the projection.  
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 19  Note that the scenarios do not take into account possible changes in origin-destination flows triggered by Brexit  
or the possible future accession of the Western Balkans into the EU.
 20  International migration is modelled using the constant immigration flow of 2 million to the EU annually  
and constant emigration rates from EU Member States to third countries. The emigration rates are country-specific  
and held constant at the level observed in 2013-2016. The computation is based on Eurostat data. Fertility,  
mortality and educational progression assumptions are the same in all three scenarios presented in this section.
 21  Austria, Germany, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and France.
 22  An extensive discussion of these causal mechanisms is provided by Lutz and Skirbekk (2014).
 23  Other countries (i.e. Mali with 5.6 children and Sudan with 4 children) are in the middle. Additional details  
are available from Appendix 2 in Lutz et al. (2018). 
 24  According to Caldwell (1992), there is a persistence of reproductive behaviours among African women: fertility  
is slightly lower at intermediate ages and slightly higher among younger and older women (differences in age  
patterns are related to differences in the age at the first birth and inter-birth intervals). 
 25  A reduction in desired family size can result from the rising costs of children and their declining economic value  
(e.g. for labour and old-age support).
 26  The definition was adopted by Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) to identify the distinct African demographic transitions.
 27  The percentage is calculated by considering the world population provided by the medium scenario in 2060  
(9.7 billion) and the estimation provided by the stalled development scenario (11 billion).
 28  The percentage is calculated according to the world population provided by the medium scenario in 2060  
(9.7 billion) and the estimation provided by the rapid development scenario (8.9 billion).
 29  This obviously implies that projection results should not be interpreted as predictions, but merely as outcomes  
from a ‘what if?’ exercise.
 30  Section 3 discusses the impact of immigration from third countries to the EU, with its impact on the size  
of the EU's future labour force, its educational composition and on the LFDR. However, it does not make particular 
reference as to which third countries the migrants are coming from, nor does it provide figures on the number  
of migrants entering the EU.  
 31  The informal sector or economy is that part of the economy that is neither taxed nor controlled by any form  
of government. Activities of the informal economy are not included in a country’s gross national product or gross 
domestic product. 
 32  According to Lutz et al. (2018), general access to school will remain a major challenge for a significant part  
of the SSA population, and more than 13% of the Zambian population, or 16% of Congolese will not be able  
to progress beyond primary school by 2020.
 33  The youth bulge is a common phenomenon in many developing countries, in particular in the least-developed 
countries. It is often due to a stage of development whereby a country achieves success in reducing infant  
mortality but mothers still have a high fertility rate. The result is that a large share of the population comprises 
children and young adults – today’s children are tomorrow’s young adults.
 34  SPEI is a measure of droughts which accounts for the effect of both precipitation (e.g. rainfall) and potential  
evapotranspiration. Evapotranspiration is the process by which water is transferred from the land  
to the atmosphere by evaporation from the soil and other surfaces, and by transpiration from plants.
 35  The limits of migration data are discussed in the following reports by IOM and McKinsey & Company (2018), 
Willekens  et al. (2016), as well as Santamaria and Vespe (2018) as part of the European Commission's Knowledge 
Centre for Migration and Demography initiative on improving the gaps and challenges of migration data. 
 36  An example illustrating discrepancies in reporting is that of Lithuania and UK. In 2011, Lithuania reported 26 395 
people migrating to UK while, in the same year, the UK reported 16 360 migrants from Lithuania.
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 37  The European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion organised  
a number of initiatives around the demographic future of Europe – for instance, launching a European Observatory 
for Demography, Social Situation and Family. 
 38  The European Migration Network is an EU network of migration and asylum experts, coordinated by the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs.
 39  The Joint Research Centre’s Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography and the CEPAM, as well as many 
Horizon 2020 and European Research Council projects, directly and indirectly deal with topics related to migration 
and demographic trends in Europe and around the world.
 40  Eurostat plays a central role in coordinating and harmonising the demographic data collection by EU Member 
States. However, its mandate in this field is limited as it does not allow for analyses with respect to possible  
sending countries of migrants or multidimensional population projections in Europe.
 41  This is a consortium of currently 32 demographic research centres in Europe, including all the leading national 
population research institutes as well as academic research units: https://www.population-europe.eu/
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